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I. INTRODUCTION
The problems contributing to the incidence of shipbuild-
ing claims and their resulting consequences are not of recent
vintage. The Navy had been entangled in disputes with pri-
vate shipbuilders at least since 1862. On 9 September of
that year, a contract was signed for a side-wheel steamer to
be built within 176 days at a cost of $75,000 plus $500 to be
paid to a boiler manufacturer. Due to changes introduced by
the Navy and delays caused by the boilermaker, the ship was
on the ways for over a year and cost overruns amounted to
$16,000; $5,000 of this amount was claimed by the Navy to be
its responsibility. The remaining costs were charged against
the contractor who ultimately went bankrupt [1]
.
The more recent conflict, in which the Navy has been in-
volved with its major shipbuilders, is of far greater mone-
tary proportion but of seemingly equal financial hardship
for many of the contractors. Even though most of these 12
"major" shipyards are associated with large conglomerates,
they continue to bemoan the extreme fiscal constraints to
which they are subjected while having to endure the complex
and time-consuming claim settlement process. Clearly it is
a matter of concern to the Naval organization, if it wishes
to maintain a broad based industry capable of producing its
modern warships.

It is the intention of this author to explore the influ-
ence of the claims procedure upon the financial stability of
one such company-Litton/Ingalls. The discussion will consid-
er eight successive "milestones" which reflect an assessment
of the financial hardships as reported by this contractor
over the last ten years. The "milestones" will include a de-
scriptive analysis of the factors contributing to the diffi-
culties threatening at the time, the efforts of the company
to anticipate and counter these infringements on its "health"
and the Navy's alternatives weighed in its dealings with the
contractor. These claims impact not only upon the company's
business relationship with the Navy, but often interfere with
the conduct of operations associated with other product lines,
It is not intended to discuss the numerous reasons for
the increased incidence of the claims, but rather the effect
of such claims upon the parties involved. For further en-
lightenment on the causes of claims, the reader's attention
is directed to presentations by Commander Art Meiners [2]
,
Mr. Fred O'Green, President of Litton Industries, Inc. [3] or
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover [4]
.
It must be noted at the onset, that review of volumes of
literature relating to dealings with Litton/Ingalls and dis-
cussions with DOD personnel indicate an apparent reluctance
of the company to fully substantiate the reported impairment
resulting from the claims. It is felt that this hesitation
is a result of either a company effort to prevent inadvertent
disclosure of corporate data (concerning matters which are

not related to Government contracts) to the Navy and/or com-
petitors or a direct attempt to conceal facts which might
weaken the plea for monetary relief for the shipbuilding
division while the corporation, as a whole, is prosperous.
1. Kidd, Isaac, Jr., ADM, USN, "The Procurement Claims
Problem, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings
,
v. 101, #9/371, p. 27, September 1975.
2. Meiners, Arthur C, CDR, USN, Shipbuilding Claims—What
Are They and What Can We Do About Them
,
Speech Presented
at the Fifth Annual Department of Defense Procurement
Research Symposium, Monterey, California.
3. O'Green, Fred, President, Litton Industries, Department
of Defense Appropriations for 1973, Hearings before a
Subcommitee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session
,
Part 4, p. 312, 1977.
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Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Subject:
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Shipbuilding claims have experienced a rather rapid
growth over the past ten years. In 1963 the amount of exist-
ing claims was $63 million. By 1971, this figure climbed to
$1 billion and as of April 1973 peaked at §2.69 billion. Ac-
companying this increase was a change in the "attitudes" ex-
pressed in the claims. Prior to mid-1975, about 50% of the
claims were submitted for hard-core changes and about 42% for
delay and disruption; after mid-1975, this trend reversed with
only 20% attributed to changes while delay and disruption
claims swelled to 70% of the total [1] . This trend is signi-
ficant in that the hard-core changes are readily documented
by the contractor with the presentation of accounting data
supporting labor and material costs. Delay and disruption
costs, however, are more difficult to resolve in that the
amounts assigned are often the result of subjective decisions
which contribute to weak or non-existent substantiation in
the accounting records. Consequently, in recent years, con-
tractors have been faced with the dilemma of having to absorb
the steadily rising costs until such time as the claims can
be resolved.
The growth of Litton/ Ingalls ' claims was no less spectac-
ular—from $3.5 million in 1970 to $504 million in 1975 and
finally to $1.09 billion in 1978 with only 13% of the final
amount attributed to hard-core changes [2] . As an insight to

the overall gravity of the situation, one must consider the
general areas of concern to the shipbuilder. In addition to
absorbing the costs of material and labor, which are included
in the claim, the contractor must expend considerable energy
and finances to pursue a settlement. Although the first ele-
ment of the LHA claim arose in 1972, it was not until April
1975 that the company presented the proper documentation to
support the allegations. The final portion of that claim
was finally documented during September 1977. Consequently,
the slow rate at which this claim could be processed has re-
sulted in significant expenses for the corporation and the
Navy. It has been estimated, that over the life of the
claim issue, Litton/ Ingalls will have spent slightly more
than $50 million on claim litigation and processing costs.
This expense, if correct, assumes substantial proportions
when one realizes that it exceeds the company's cumulative
reported net earnings of $49,492 million for the period 1972
to 1976. However, these costs do offer a tax deduction.
Additionally, information presented by the company indi-
cates an impact on its fiscal position in three other areas
—
lending difficulties, stockholder apprehension and cash short-
ages which might have curtailed investments in more profitable
endeavors. As the unreimbursed expenses for labor and mate-
rial increased, the company reported increasing limits on its
necessary borrowings to maintain performance; in view of the
dim prospects for recovery of some of these costs, the lend-
ing banks expressed doubt about the company's ability to
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conform to future loan agreements. This predicament stemmed
from anticipated violations of lending covenants. It is of
interest to note that a study completed in December 1977 com-
pared Litton, Inc. to industry standards published in the
ALMANAC OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL FINANCIAL RATIOS . The
various product lines promoted by Litton were equated to 14
identifiable industries for which financial ratios were
listed in the ALMANAC . The percentage of each product line's
contribution to Litton 's total sales was multiplied by the
respective industry ratio. These 14 figures were then added
for each of the ratios to derive a simulated conglomerate
ratio against which the published standards could be compared,
Included in the six indices computed for Litton were the Cur-
rent and Total Liabilities to Net Worth ratios both of which
had been included in recent Credit Agreements. In all areas
but one, Net Sales to Net Working Capital, Litton met or ex-
ceeded the industry standards from FY 73-FY 77 [3]
.
Litton experienced the growing disenchantment of the
stockholders with fading growth potential in early '68 when
its stock fell 18 points in one week and subsequently to one
half of its 1967-1968 high of $120.38; this price decline
closely followed the report of the first earnings decline in
57 quarters. A review of Litton 's annual reports finds such
phrases as "Litton concluded fiscal year 1972 in a sound fi-
nancial position....", "The Company maintains the position
that a final court decision based on equity should result in
full recovery of all LHA and DD costs" (1976) and in the
11

report for the nine months ended April 30, 1978, which dis-
closed the proposed settlement of the claim, "Litton now
looks forward to applying its full resources to the broad-
based profit growth it is already demonstrating." All of
these assurances were obviously intended to sustain necessary
support from the investors; however, there are indications
that these glowing commentaries may have been less than to-
tally forthright and indicative of the situation at that time,
In May 1977, the SEC ordered an investigation of financial
information presented in Litton 's filings with the SEC and
stockholder reports since 1972. There was concern for the
manner in which the company had handled reporting of claims
and potential claims, allocation of costs between military
and commercial contracts and statements on the income, reve-
nue, assets and liabilities. Although the scope of this in-
quiry was of a rather broad nature, this scrutiny by the SEC
combined with past examinations of the company's policy on
reporting claims, would do little to support the impressions
of well-being previously presented to the stockholders.
Since its creation, Litton had prided itself on its
growth through acquisitions. Within the first three years
of its existence, acquisitions accounted for approximately
88% of its growth. From 1960 to 1968, the company acquired
103 firms for a price of $846.4 million. These purchases
were made predominantly by the use of Litton stock as the
medium of exchange. In recent years, this growth rate has
been tempered considerably. Despite the apparent change of
12

company policy toward development of presently controlled
product lines, Litton has advertised the cash flow deficiency
generated in its shipbuilding endeavor to be highly restric-
tive in the execution of corporate goals. There have been
numerous cash flow schedules prepared, both in the company's
fiscal year plans and in various DOD and GAO studies. These
projections were subject, of course, to the changes in pay-
ment schedules occurring over the life of the LHA/DD 963 con-
tracts. Nevertheless, cash flow shortages of varying magni-
tudes have existed within the shipbuilding division for a
great portion of the time; however, without extensive know-
ledge of the company's long term investment intentions, it
would be difficult to arrive at a firm conclusion on the
future impact of the cash shortages.
As the second party in this ongoing dispute, the Navy
has also suffered repercussions in that it has lost credibil-
ity with the Congress and present administration. Congress-
man Les Aspin (D-Wisc.) and Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisc.)
have maintained a very close surveillance on the Navy's at-
tempts to ease the contractor's burden; this attention was
directed at preventing a "bail out" of the shipbuilder. In
1972, Mr. Aspin expressed concern that a change to the LHA
delivery schedule "appears that the Navy has arbitrarily
given Litton a gift of $3 million of the taxpayer's money" in
lost liquidated damages [4]. In 1974 and 1975, he again
attacked the Navy for providing additional money to the con-
tractor. The Navy's attempts to include in the FY 76 budget,
13

$100.9 million for possible future claim payments to Litton,
were met with charges of being "a stupid mistake which crip-
ples their (the Navy) negotiating position" [5]
.
In mid-1972, Senator Proxmire called for GAO and SEC in-
vestigations of Litton's ability to financially support the
completion of shipbuilding contracts. His allusion to an im-
pending financial crisis within the company was answered by
a Litton spokesman who stated that the company is "capable of
supporting all cash requirements" [6]
.
In March 1978, President Carter disclosed a 5 year ship-
building plan which included only 70 new ships, a number half
of those sought by the Navy. Protests from many levels with-
in DOD were met with countercharges of mismanagement of the
shipbuilding programs. During a speech at the Naval War
College, Edward R. Jayne, an associate director for national
security within 0MB, stated that the shipbuilding difficulties
were a primary reason for Carter's decision. Furthermore, he
added that unless "visible progress" toward better management
was made within the next year, the Air Force and Army would
again get priority over the Navy during budget planning. Pres-
ent indications are that a reassessment of the Naval missions
and responsibilities may have also influenced the President's
action. Nonetheless, the widespread dissemination of the
Navy's deteriorating business relationships could hardly be
expected to provide a positive outlook for the possibility of
a successful reclama to the budgetary reduction.
14
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To fully understand a shipbuilder's proclivity to initi-
ate claims and their influence upon his business, structure,
one must recall the rather dramatic changes which have trans-
pired within the industry over the past ten years. During
the late 1960 's and early 1970' s, the future of the industry
appeared rather promising. Nearly 70% of the ships in the
Navy were 20 years of age or older. The Navy was embarked
upon replacement of these vessels and budget support for the
extensive building program seemed imminent. The Great Lakes
ore and grain fleet was an average of over 45 years old and
in need of revitalization . Congress was considering and
ultimately authorized merchantship building and operating
subsidies.
During a discussion of the revised subsidies, President
Nixon had conveyed to the Congress his desire to assist the
shipbuilding industry. He stated, "We should make it possible
for industry to build more ships over the next ten years,
moving from the present subsidy level of about ten ships a
year to a new level of 30 ships a year" [1] . As a means of
accomplishing that goal, he urged the use of multi-year pro-
curement by the government to allow the shipbuilders to




A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMATED YARD
At Litton/Ingalls the outlook was equally auspicious.
Ingalls was a shipyard which had enjoyed the distinction of
several "firsts" since it was established at Pascagoula in
1938. It had pioneered the use of all-welded steel ship
hulls, introduced stabilized antenna platforms for seagoing
missile tracking devices, developed non-leaking submarine
periscope seals and had produced the first roll-on roll-off
container ships [2]
.
Following an operating loss in 1967, there was doubt a-
bout the yard's ability to compete for new business in the
forthcoming years. The shipyard management judged the East
bank facilities to be too small to accommodate the wider beam
ships they expected to be built soon. In addition, the end-
launch style of shipways used in this yard was considered to
be approaching obsolescence and many of the piers and ten
shipways required extensive corrective maintenance prior to
further use. To effect the magnitude of repairs necessary
would severely interfere with any shipbuilding efforts in
progress. As an alternative to updating an aged shipyard
plagued with reduced capacity, it was decided to proceed with
development of the West bank facility. The choice to proceed
with this capital expansion program was supported by five
factors which projected the success of such an endeavor:
a. By being the first to build a yard of the proposed
advanced style, it was expected that production would be opti-
mized to such a degree as to allow considerable customer
17

savings. The competition was not expected to be in a posi-
tion in which they could or would follow suit.
b. A decision to build immediately would assure the
availability of the needed land and would likely elicit fi-
nancial assistance from the Port Authority, County and State
Governments '.
c. Making a generous proposal to the labor union prior
to the expiration of the present contract might enable the
company to get a labor force "locked in" for a relatively
long period; additionally, continued use of heavy discipline,
when warranted, should break the prevailing "walkout psychol-
ogy" exhibited by many within the labor force.
d. Commencing these modernization efforts should place
Ingalls in a position to be the prime candidate for the LHA
program and allow it to meet the necessary delivery schedules,
e. The apparent desires of the Navy to continue the use
of Contract Definition could be best satisfied by combining
the technical/management capability of the Advanced Marine
Technical Division (AMTD) in California with the modular con-
struction capability at Ingalls.
Unlike traditional shipbuilding in which the ship is
built from the keel up in one position, modular construction
brings the work to the workmen on small trolley cars. Each
compartment is built and outfitted before it is "stacked up"
with others as the major sections of the ship move along the
assembly line. The ship sections are finally joined as the
vessel approaches the launch area at which time the ship is




The sentiment of the company was expressed by Mr. Ellis
Gardner, President of Ingalls when he stated, "On the other
hand, there is simply no prospect whatsoever of engaging in
large-scale Navy shipbuilding total package procurement un-
less we are prepared to develop the competence and stand the
expense of such bidding" [3] . This optimism soon gave way
to frustration and despair. In 1965, the Department of De-
fense instituted the use of Total Package Procurement (TPP)
for ship production. The LHA was the first ship produced
using this method. The inability to develop equitable cost
and risk-sharing data and an incomplete definition of the
ship's characteristics foretold the gross inadequacies of the
TPP system. Consequently, the Defense Department's decision
to enforce the use of this system, despite its deficiencies,
is considered to be a primary factor in the incidence of the
LHA/DD-963 claim.
The changing economic climate, which developed in the mid-
70s and continues today, has raised serious doubts about the
future success of Ingalls and the shipbuilding industry in
general
.
B. PRESENT SHIPBUILDING CLIMATE
The 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo heralded a reduced demand
for merchant shipping assets. Vessel orders in the United
States were at a peak in 1972, when 48 ships totaling 1.55M
gross tons were ordered, and in 1973, when orders were placed
for 43 ships equal to 2.02M tons. During 1977, new orders
were submitted for only 13 ships (266,000 gross tons) with an
19

aggregate value of $582.5 million [4], Due to the decline in
the shipbuilders' orderbook, it is estimated that by 1983,
the number of workers, who are employed in the 12 major yards
serving the Navy, will decline to about 50% of its present
level. An economic model developed for the Maritime Adminis-
tration indicates that a "multiplier effect" reduction will
affect 103,000 workers in industries providing supplies and
support to the shipbuilders [5] . A prime consideration of
the Defense estabishment is the time required to re-man
these yards in the event of a conflict requiring the produc-
tion of ships, boats, landing craft, etc.
In addition to having to cope with the devastating ef-
fects of the American economy, the shipbuilders have found
that the competition for available new orders has become in-
creasingly strong from countries such as Japan, Taiwan,
Brazil and South Korea. A CIA report published in November
1977, indicated that, despite cancellation of 55M gross
2
tons of tanker orders between 1974-1977, there is approxi-
mately 37% of the world oil-carrying capacity considered to
be a surplus. Petroleum price increases, world-wide recession
and reopening of the Suez Canal had simply decreased the
demand for the tankers. Some ship owners were able to convert
2Gross tons (GT) are normally used to measure ship produc-
tion while ship capacity is commonly measured in deadweight
tons (DWT). Ratios of DWT to GT vary from 2.0 for large
tankers to 1.0 for passenger ships.
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tanker orders to bulk carrier construction contracts to avoid
payment of cancellation fees. Consequently, the change in
orders along with the recession resulted in a surplus of 10M
deadweight tons of those ships in late 1977. Further compli-
cating this overcapacity is the fact that Japan continues to
win about 50% of the world's new orders. U.S. companies or
their affiliates ordered 25 merchant vessels (each 5,000 DWT+)
from Japanese yards during the first ten months of 1977; this
is almost twice the number of new orders placed with U.S.
yards during the entire year. American and European ship-
builders are unable to compete with the construction prices
offered by Japan [6]
.
During a recent speech to the Southern Governor's Confer-
ence, Edwin Hood, Board Chairman and President of the Ship-
builders Council of America, expressed little hope for any
improvement in the near future. The clouded future of mer-
chantship construction was further complicated by a drasti-
cally reduced Naval shipbuilding program. President Carter's
request for FY 79 alone had declined from 31 to 15 new ships.
Mr. Hood called attention to the lack of a coordinated
national policy to preserve an effective shipbuilding indus-
trial base. He faulted the government for its failure to
recognize the adverse outlook for the industry and its em-
ployees. He stated, "It seems clear that without a coordi-
nated policy on shipbuilding, the downward trend will continue
and inevitably lead to an irretrievable loss of capability in
this country with consequent higher prices for ships produced
by a reduced resource base" [7],
21

C. PRODUCTION DELAYS AT INGALLS
The management of Ingalls shared with the industry leaders
the grave concern for future utilization of its assets. Of a
more immediate nature, however, were three major problem
areas . emerging with the production of the LHA and DD-963. The
first was that of a stable work force. Litton/Ingalls , along
with many of the competitors, was faced with a continual short-
age of workers in the skilled trades. Data published by
Ingalls in June 1974 indicated shortfalls as follows: Pipe-
fitters-120, Electricians/Electronics-279, Welders-143 and
Shipf itters-212. These shortages were attributed to superior
wage competition from the heavy construction industry and the
inability of Ingalls to compensate, at a later date, for early
program delays attributed to the Navy. The following data
compiled by the Shipbuilders Council of America illustrates
the amount by which the national average weekly earnings in










Faced with the requirement to build ships, Ingalls had
little choice but to hire available labor resources in an at-
tempt to meet the schedules imposed by the contracts. The
average Mississippian is considered to be, by nature, a per-
son who can be quite stubborn and will often do what he feels
is best for him despite resultant costs to himself or his
family. Consequently, assignment to an unpleasant task, the
arrival of hunting or fishing season or the hope for a better
job elsewhere could prompt the worker to temporarily abandon
his shipyard assignment. Between June 1973 and June 1974,
about 15,000 workers were hired at Ingalls; approximately
65% of that number had no previous shipbuilding skills. Dur-
ing this same period, 13,000 workers left the yard with more
than 40% having less than 3 months experience i.e. trainees.
Considering that total employees in the yard numbered 19,287
on 1 March 1974, this turnover rate would have taxed the most
adept production managers even under more ideal conditions.
Approximately 69% of the workers leaving the shipbuilding in-
dustry utilize their new-found skills in higher paying and
less physically demanding jobs [3] . Unfortunately, this trend
indicates that the shipyards are often little more than a
training ground for more lucrative industries. This retention
difficulty along with an often unpredictable absentee rate
resulted in manpower productivity rates well below those
utilized for initial cost estimates.
Subsequent schedule slippages resulting from the labor
shortages became more uncontrollable with the onset of runaway
23

inflation. The LHA contract stated that 20% of the initial
target price would constitute labor costs subject to escala-
tion adjustment while 65% of the target price provided mate-
rial cost adjustments. These costs were apportioned by per-
centages over a period shorter than the ultimate contract
life. With initial progress falling far below expectation,
early costs were less than the apportioned values; conse-
quently, the costs incurred later in the program were greater
than the amount which could be adjusted for inflation. The
rapid inflation of this period acting upon the "bow wave" of
delayed costs proved to be the undoing of any attempts at
cost control.
Litton' s President Fred 0' Green provided several examples
during Congressional testimony; from 1973 to 1974, the price
of wire rope rose from 34C/foot to 60£/foot, a 76% increase;
steel shot (ton) increased from $176 to $347, a 97% climb and
copper cable showed a 71% price increase going from $1.10/
foot to $1.88/foot. He added, "Looking at the effect of in-
flation another way, we use 800,000 feet of copper cable in
each DD and 2 million feet in each LHA. It now costs us
$624,000 more for cable on each destroyer and $1.56 million
more on each LHA. This is a 71% increase in price, compared
with a 22.7 percent allowance in the material index" [9].
The material index to which he refers is the Material Index
for NavSea Steel Vessel Contracts which provides a basis for
determination of escalation payments. The index rose from
128.9 in 1973 to 159.6 in 1974. A more comprehensive
24

explanation of the formulation and use of this and other es-
calation indices is available in a thesis by Ippel [10].
Subcontractors were also feeling the economic crunch. A
shortage of critical raw materials caused an increased re-
sponse time for delivery of products to the prime contractors.
Consequently, the shipyards were faced with delays of a few
weeks up to nine months for receipt of needed materials
(valves, electrical cable, tubing, etc.). The unchecked in-
flation resulted in the suppliers providing their materials
with the agreement that they receive "price in effect at time
of delivery." The effects of the spiraling prices were felt
throughout all industries, but they must have proved most
frustrating to Ingalls as they saw themselves accomplishing
less work but spending more to complete it.
The third problem the corporation encountered was a lack
of overall management/coordination of the shipbuilding en-
deavor. The Advanced Marine Technical Division (AMTD), which
was located in Culver City, California, was responsible for
the design and engineering functions. This division displayed
a definite orientation toward the aerospace style of production,
Plans were drawn with strict tolerances which could not be
duplicated in a marine environment. During initial fabrication
of the first components, it was discovered that the steel had
been cut to such precise measurements that there was insuffi-
cient excess to allow welding. The geographical separation
of the "designers" and the "builders" served only to compound
the ill feelings between the groups. Mr. John Williams, Vice
25

President in charge of Production at Ingalls, characterized
the early misunderstanding as one of "having competent aero-
space designers who knew little about building ships and
capabile shipbuilders who were unfamiliar with aerospace
design techniques."
When Ingalls began shipbuilding operations at Pascagoula
in 1938, some 23 years before their association with Litton,
the yard was erected simultaneously with the signing of a
contract for the first four C3 cargo ships to be built in
that facility. Ingalls was successful in producing ships
within a new yard which was still under construction. Per-
haps it was the memory of that past endeavor which spurred
a similar attempt with the West bank facility. Unfortunately,
the complex nature of this "yard of the future" was not nearly
as forgiving as its East bank predecessor. The advanced
technology inherent in the modern warships required much
greater attention than Ingalls had anticipated. Not surpris-
ingly, they discovered early on their inability to cope with
the demands of three immense, yet intricate, concurrent de-
velopments—a shipyard and two classes of ships. The move in
1972 to unite the East and West bank resources into a common
effort and the relocation of the AMTD from California to
Mississippi resulted in an elementary, yet tangible, improve-
ment in their endeavor. Today, both the Navy and Litton agree
that the yard is performing in the manner for which it was




As later chapters elaborate on specific events and deci-
sions instrumental to the impact of the claims upon Litton/
Ingalls, it is important to remember that total responsibility
for the claims cannot be placed solely upon the Navy and/or
the shipbuilders. Inflation, the oil embargo and skilled
•worker shortages are just three of the many contributing
causes which have aggravated the claims incidence and settle-
ment; however, these same three are beyond the control of
either of the concerned parties. It is true that better
planning and execution by the contractor or more equitable
contract clauses offered by the Navy might have tempered the
blow of these elements; yet, their very existence has often
been blamed for the increased magnitude of claims which may
or may not have arisen under more stable conditions. The
bottom line is costs—reduce the uncompensated costs for
contractors and claims should diminish. Failing to accomplish
that goal, it is necessary to consider how severely the costs
will infringe upon the corporations' operations both in ship-
building and other divisions. This is the intent of subse-
quent chapters.
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Reducing the Litton/ Ingalls claims against the Navy has
proven to be a lengthy and highly emotional issue. This
yard, perhaps more than any others serving the Navy, has
associated the shipbuilding claims incidence with their on-
going financial shortfalls. If one were to depict the de-
velopments over the past ten years as a graphic presentation,
it would be possible to detect highs and lows as the inten-
sity of the contractor's protests rises and subsides. These
highs are the milestones which will be discussed in this
chapter. They should be viewed as instances when the corpora-
tion's financial liability was perceived to be most acute.
Presentation of each milestone will include the events
preceding it, the alternatives and/or decisions with which it
dealt and the future impact of its occurrence. The events
associated with each milestone are the result of Navy actions,
company maneuvers or a combination of both. Nevertheless,
the thread of commonality is the possible financial disaster
reportedly haunting Ingalls.
A. CONTRACT AWARD
The first milestone is that of the awarding of contracts.
The authors (MEINERS, O'GREEN, RICKOVER), previously mentioned
as substantial sources of claim data, all include some aspect
of the contract as a "cause" for the incidence of the claims.
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However, it is more than that alone. Specific clauses, such
as escalation, Total System Responsibility and methods of
payment, were perfectly valid when agreed to by the contrac-
tor. Subsequent developments, such as inflation, when viewed
in conjunction with provisions of the contract, placed upon
the shipbuilder substantial fiscal responsibility not intended
during the contract award.
As stated earlier, the time frame of reference is the past
ten years. Within that period, contracts were signed with
Ingalls for the production of four ammunition ships (AE 32-35)
awarded March 1968; three nuclear submarines (SSN 680, 682,
683) awarded June 1968; nine LHA (LHA 1-9) awarded May 1969;
30 destroyers (DD 963-992) awarded in 1970 and four additional
destroyers for the Iranian Navy (DD 993-996) awarded March
1973. The first two classes were built in the old East bank
facility while the latter three are under construction on the
West bank.
Even though claims have arisen on all but the last group,
the LHA claim far outweighs those of the earlier ships. At
the time of their settlements in May 1976 and September 1974
respectively, the SSN had a claimed value of $31.5 million
and the AE claim was set at $35.9 million. The claimed value
of the SUBSAFE claim reached $140.2 million prior to its
resolution in February 1978. The Navy ultimately paid $87.6
million to liquidate these three claims. The LHA issue (in-
cluding DD-963 impact) peaked at $1.09 billion and resulted
in a $312 million proposed settlement figure. Consequently,
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the analyses throughout this chapter will concentrate on this
large claim resulting from LHA construction. Claims arising
from other units will be introduced when pertinent to the
point of discussion.
In early 1968, Litton was involved in the first stages
of construction of the new West bank shipyard; this facility
was financed primarily by the $130 million tax-free state
bonds which had been sold by Mississippi in an effort to lure
Litton away from its alternate site in Florida. Over the
years, there have been a wide range of figures promulgated
stating the amount of Litton 's out of pocket investment in
the yard. A 1969 FORBES article estimated Litton' s initial
investment at $3 million [1] . Although Litton has never offi-
cially divulged the cost of establishing the yard, company
representatives have suggested that the capital expenditure
amounted to nearly $600 million, including the $130 million
from the bond issue [2]
.
Prior to the start of shipyard construction, it had been
announced that Litton was successful in its bid to procure
the production contract for approximately 30 Fast Deployment
Logistics (FDL) ships to be built at a cost of $1.4 billion.
It was envisioned that this ship would "enhance U.S. military
rapid deployment capability by providing a high speed,
flexible, sealift force capable of rapid overseas deployment
of tactical land force units in conjunction with airlift" [3]
.
It was the prospect of mass production of this line of ships
which enhanced Litton 's decision to proceed with the "Shipyard
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of the Future". When Congressional funding was omitted for
the FDL thereby cancelling the program, Litton immediately
diverted its energies to securing the LHA contract.
1. LHA Contract
The construction of a new class of complex warship
within this untested modular concept shipyard was in itself
a formidable undertaking. A third element, the type of con-
tract, could add another unknown to the' equation. The LHA
would be the first class of ship to be built using the Total
Package Procurement model. With this approach, the contrac-
tor was responsible for the design, development and construc-
tion of a large number of ships to be delivered over a period
of years. The administration of this contract would differ
from past procurement actions in that no drawings were sub-
ject to Navy approval, any discrepancies in the final speci-
fications were the contractor's responsibility and Navy
approvals were to be held to a minimum [4] . Essentially,
the contractor was told to design a ship to carry out a mis-
sion and determine how many were needed for that mission; in
turn, the Navy would keep its "hands off".
In the case of the LHA, a basic concept of the per-
formance expected from the ship was presented to Litton,
General Dynamics and Newport News with the intention that
each formulate a design to meet the expectations. Each yard
was awarded a fixed price contract for this effort; Litton 's
contract paid $6.4 million.
Following four months review and negotiations with
the contractors, it was decided in May 1968 that only Litton
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was eligible to continue its attempt to secure a production
contract. It must be noted that the Source Selection Evalua-
tion Board found none of the three proposals to be satisfac-
tory; however, it felt that Litton * s was closest to the en-
visioned design. Litton' s proposal called for production of
six ships at a price of $104,566,182 each.
In August 1968, Litton was directed to submit a re-
vised price proposal based on the technical corrections which
had been made to the original plan and a change to a nine
ship package. Their October resubmission included price ad-
justments for the changes and for their own original proposal,
This new figure was rejected; Litton then submitted another
price supposedly reflecting additional costs due only to the
changes. This figure was identical to that offered in
October. Through the latter part of 1968 and early 1969,
meetings between the Navy and Litton continued in an attempt
to include all technical requirements necessary to meet the
Navy's needs and to arrive at a stable price.
This continual changing of design would later be pre-
sented by the contractor as a basis for the magnitude of his
claims. Litton charged that the short time period allowed
for the changes did not allow proper study of the effects on
the total system i.e. how much extra they would cost to in-
corporate. Litton contended "With these (design) studies
progressing but incomplete by the date of award of the con-
tract, there was no way in which either the contractor or the
government could predict the requirements for changes which
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would grow out of the results of such studies. Nor could the
company have taken the results of such studies into considera-
tion as determining any portion of the contract price " [5]
(emphasis added). The contractor felt that he was bidding on
a ship of unknown dimension and price. Nevertheless, he con-
tinued to negotiate with the Navy.
On 31 January 1969, a Pre-Negotiation Clearance was




Target Cost $1,015,516,512 $897,129,526
Target Profit $ 91,396,486 (9%) $ 86,124,434 (9.6%)
Target Price $1,106,912,993 $983,253,960
Ceiling Price $1,218,619,814 (120% $1,076,555,431 (120%
cost) cost)
The Chief of Naval Material granted conditional ap-
proval which directed the negotiators to consider the use of
either a Fixed Price contract with successive pricing targets
(FPIS) for all ships or a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract
for the lead ship with Firm Fixed Price (FFP) for following
ships. The reasons for this direction included a lack of com-
petitive climate, the uncertainties of cost data associated
with a new yard and the successive increases in the contrac-
tor's price estimates. The per ship cost estimate (for a
nine ship package) had increased 29% from his original offer.
When the Total Package Procurement method was insti-
tuted by Secretary McNamara in 1965, his directive included
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that fixed pricing should also be used for major weapons pro-
curements. This instruction remained effective in 1969; con-
sequently, the LHA contract, which was signed on 1 May 1969,
was an FPIS contract with final pricing negotiations to occur
approximately 34 months later. This method would allow final
prices to be established based on the cost information gained
during the early stages of production. The initial cost per
ship was set at $112.5 million with 9 ships included in the
contract; the first was scheduled for delivery 47 months
later.
Two provisions included in the contract had signifi-
cant subsequent impact upon the contractor's financial posi-
tion. The payment provision was uncharacteristically composed
of two different payment methods. During the first 40 months
or until LHA-1 was delivered, there would be little physical
progress recorded due to the concentration on final design
efforts; therefore, the contractor would be paid for all
allowable costs. Following the expiration of that period,
the payments would then be based upon percent of physical pro-
gress; during the early months of progress payments, the
amount remitted to the contractor would be adjusted to account
for any difference between what he had been paid under the
cost system and what he would have been paid under a progress
system.
As mentioned earlier, the government had agreed to
maintain a "hands off" attitude in the execution of the con-




The Total System Responsibility Clause was included in the
contract. Essentially, it required that the Contractor
"assume full responsibility for delivering LHA ships that
meet or exceed the performance requirements/capabilities of
section 3 of such contract specifications" [7]. Any changes,
which would be required by the contractor in order to carry
out the contract, would be accomplished at no cost to the
government and with no change in the delivery schedule.
Two other contracts, which were signed by Ingalls
during this same period, ultimately expanded the limits of
claim liability. In October 1968, Ingalls contracted to
build seven merchant ships, four for FARRELL Lines and three
for AMERICAN PRESIDENT Lines (APL). A fourth APL ship was
later included in the agreement. It was planned that the
relative simplicity of these eight ships would provide an
ideal opportunity to initiate the "assembly-line" concept
prior to the start of LHA construction. Unanticipated delays
on the first ships prompted Ingalls to build four of them
in the old East bank yard rather than risk additional inter-
ference with the much-delayed Navy contracts.
2. DD-963 Contract
On 23 June 1970, Litton won a contract to build 30
destroyers. The award of this contract was surrounded by
considerable controversy. The DD-963 class was procured
utilizing the Total Package Procurement method. Following
the evaluation of six initial bidders, contract definition
contracts were given to Bath Iron Works, Litton/Ingalls and
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General Dynamics. The latter party was eventually eliminated;
following several rounds of bidding, each of the two remain-
ing submitted a fourth and "best and final" offer in March
1970. The requirements called for bids based on an FPIS pro-
curement of 30 ships. Although the base cost presented by
Bath was $95.6 million lower than Litton's, the final cost
was higher. The difference was a result of each contractor's
estimate of inflation during the length of the contract.
Litton computed a $143.7 million overrecovery of escalation
while Bath derived a $146.3 million underpayment [8]. Follow-
ing adjustments for their estimates, Bath's target cost was
$61.3 million per ship compared to Litton's $54.9 million.
Following the announcement of the contract award, Bath filed
protests stating that they had been mislead as to what costs
would be considered in awarding the contract. Documents pre-
sented by the Navy indicated that Bath had, in fact, under-
stood the bid process; consequently, the contract was given
to Litton, the low bidder!
At the onset, Navy negotiators felt that Litton's
pricing was "very tight"; however, consideration of several
factors indicated an apparent ability to meet the goal. Add-
ing the 963 program to the already large LHA package would
permit a wider spread of the overhead. Ingalls, being an
entity within a corporate organization, should enjoy less
management expenses than Bath and labor rates were lower in
Pascagoula than in Maine [9]
.
Senators Smith and Muskie of Maine attempted to add




which would force Litton to sub-contract production of half
the ships. Despite speeches to the Senate, appeals to the
Administration and GAO investigations of the procurement pro-
cess, the amendment was stopped by the Senate Armed Services
Committee, whose chairman was Senator Stennis of Mississippi.
Litton 's repeated success in securing these contracts
for 47 ships indicated the three customers' willingness to
test the capabilities of the new yard. It was expected that
this revolutionary style of ship construction would breathe
new life into the American shipbuilding industry and the U.S.
Navy's warfare capabilities. This anticipation soon turned
to doubt
.
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B. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
Following the LHA contract award in May 1969 and through
most of 1970, the contractor was involved with the culmination
of the ship design. Problems, which arose during this period,
developed into program delays and provided the basis for the
initial claim against the LHA. As previously mentioned, the
contract provided that the contractor assume full responsibil-
ity for the design and production; the Navy's prime function
was to ensure that any changes introduced by the builder would
not hinder the ship's overall intended mission.
The major goal during this period was the attainment of
a system design baseline which would have Navy approval, but
progress began slipping in late 1969. In order to regain
lost time, the contractor proposed several changes to the
ship. The Navy review of these suggestions was completed in
September 1970 and Litton was presented with 2,905 documented
comments on the drawings and specifications [1] . Following
an abbreviated survey of the documents, Litton made an announce-
ment which confirmed Navy suspicions that the start of pro-
duction would be delayed. In December 1970, the corporation
confirmed that LHA-1 would be delayed ten months and that
they would be submitting a Request for Equitable Adjustment
(REA) to the contract price.
In a document submitted later in the program, Litton cate-





Studies incomplete at contract award/studies required
after award . These included contemplation of rearranging the
medical facilities, changes in the model of air search radar,
design problems with electronic counter measure systems,
landing craft handling and stowage tests and ship propulsion
(rudder and screw location) studies.
2) Changes in requirements after award affecting contrac-
tor design and development . These dealt with additions to the
radar/ IFF system, changes in the radio communication systems
which hindered interface with subcontracted equipments and
revisions to the design of the flight deck island, commissary
and living spaces, cargo handling system and various habita-
bility improvements.
3) Lack of information concerning government furnished
equipment (GFE) at time of award . This involved lack of tech-
nical data on many electronic systems which were predominantly
GFE, computer software information, weapon systems capabili-
ties and ship manning data.
4) Inadequate identification of the magnitude of poten -
tial design problems at time of award . These consisted of
previous problems encountered with a conventional style stern-
gate (i.e. one hinged at the bottom), requirements for con-
tractors to comply with shock mount designs known to be in-
adequate and a lack of information available on required per-
formance of lightwater fire fighting systems [2]
.
In early December 1970, another dimension was added to
the already strained relationship. The Navy reduced from
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nine to five the number of LHAs it would purchase. The ori-
ginal need for nine ships had been based on the Navy's over-
all requirement to transport 1 2/3 Marine Amphibious Force
(MAF) (approximately 56,400 personnel). However, fiscal con-
straints established during formulation of the FY 72 Program
Objectives Memorandum (POM) limited the troop size to 1 1/3
MAF (approximately 45,100 personnel). To comply with this
reduction, only five LHAs would be needed to assist in the
troop lift; the cut was approved by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense on 5 December [3]
.
Article VIII of the contract had given the Navy the op-
portunity to cancel all ships in program years subsequent to
the FY in which the notice was given. It had originally
been computed that the average unit cost would range from
$284 million for one ship to $112.5 million for a buy of nine.
In accordance with a schedule included in the contract, Litton
was entitled to a maximum payment of $109.7 million for can-
cellation of the last four ships.
In view of the significant changes (i.e. reduction of
program size and delay of production) which had occurred since
the contract was signed, the Navy and the contractor agreed
to sign a Memorandum of Agreement. The agreement implemented,
on an interim basis, certain revisions to the terms of the
contract without prejudice to the rights of either party.
Specifically, the contractor was directed to perform the work
following a provisional schedule which delayed the delivery
dates as follows: LHA-1 12 months, LHA-2 13 months, LHA-3,
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4,5 14 months. In addition, he was to submit by 29 October
1971, a Reset Proposal which "firmed" the target cost and
price, ceiling price, delivery schedule and the sharing ratio.
The Memorandum also introduced changes which would hasten
the completion of all plans and designs. Specific time limits
were placed upon each party to speed confirmation of proposed
changes; the Resident Supervisor of Shipbuilding (RESSUPSHIP)
was given authority to consent to any remaining subcontracts
and program reviews were reduced in scope [4] . These revi-
sions attempted to improve some of the procedures which had
presented the most serious initial delays for the builder.
Essentially, the Agreement was intended to recognize and cor-
rect those elements which had prompted a deterioration of
the business relationship between the two parties. It was
hoped that this effort would alleviate further delays and
disputes involved with the LHA program. The Agreement was
to remain in effect until 31 March 1972.
At the same time the contractor was attempting to sub-
stantiate the schedule and costs in compliance with the
Memorandum, the first merchantship under construction in the
new yard was encountering difficulties. The condition of
the long-delayed AUSTRAL ENVOY, which was launched in June,
caused serious doubts among the ranks of the Naval shipbuild-
ing administration. Many of the 240 steel sections failed
to fit properly, the deckhouse sagged more than i inch, bulk-
heads buckled, one cargohold was too shallow, the anchor
failed to house properly and the ship was 3 inches shorter
43

than allowed in the specifications [5] . Despite apparent pro-
gress in avoiding as many defects on the following ships, the
general opinion was that vastly improved management, along
with some luck, was necessary to "debug" the yard in order to
avoid similar problems on the upcoming Navy work.
In July, the contractor notified the Navy that the Reset
Proposal would not be available until early 1972; he related
that key personnel needed to formulate portions of the pro-
posal were also needed to manage the LHA design completion
and to initiate the fabrication of LHA-1 in August. This
manpower shortage was further complicated by a strike which
crippled the yard from August 30 to October 4. Approximately
800 of the 5200 employees at the new facility moved away to
other jobs; the recruiting teams estimated that they lost an
additional 800 to 1000 prospects during the shutdown. Ben W.
Borne, Vice President for Industrial Relations, stated that
his goal was a 350 worker per month net increase in order to
meet employment levels required by early 1973 [6] . Few in
the Navy expected Ingalls to be able to meet that target.
Following a review of business risks on the Litton ship-
building programs, personnel from the Naval Ship System Com-
mand concluded that losses on the merchantship program would
range from $75 to $100 million; the financial resources avail-
able within the corporation indicated that Litton could
absorb losses up to $250 million without impairing the com-
pletion of the LHA and DD. Furthermore, the Navy estimated
18 to 24 months late delivery on the LHA with costs exceeding
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the contract ceiling price. Their concern was justified when
Litton submitted the Reset Proposal in March 1972.
The contractor presented a schedule which indicated that
the LHA-1 would be 19J months late with LHA-5 over 2 years
late. Included in the Reset was a REA of $246. 6M to the tar-
get cost. This constituted the first "claim" against the LHA
and was an estimate of additional costs to be incurred over
the life of the program. Much of the increase resulted from
a 22.3 million increase in the manhours required to complete
construction. Compared to the original estimate of 20.3
million, this new figure (42.6 million) represented more than
a 100% increase. Litton attributed the added labor demand to
changes and delay during engineering completion, increased
labor rates and decreases in the manpower efficiency (learn-
ing curve factors). Approximately 39% of the growth was tied
solely to changes in the ship design after the initial bid.
Consequently, the Estimated Cost At Completion (EAC) for five
ships was $1.05 billion which exceeded the original nine ship
3
contract cost by $127.5 million.
In addition to the sought after cost increases, the corp-
oration requested a 20 month extension to the cost incurred
3The original nine-ship contract had a Target Cost of
$922. 5M ($102.5M/ship) and a Ceiling Price of $1,199.25M
($133. 25M/ship) . Adjusting the original contract for the
conversion to a five-ship program, including authorized changes
and constructive change and delay allowances, raised the Ceil-
ing Price to a maximum of $1,014M ($202. 8M/ship) . However,




payments. It was their feeling that the entire delay of LHA-
1 was the fault of the government; Litton gave little consi-
deration to their own start-up problems such as planning in-
accuracies and manpower shortages. The company contended
that failure to grant this request would result in a $150
million negative cash flow during the time needed to regain
the building schedule. Despite their pleas, the Navy denied
the request; additionally, the contractor was informed that
an in-depth review of the REA could not be accomplished with
the sparse information presented in the March submission [7]
.
Litton responded with a proposal to present, in July 1972,
another submission which would justify their request for ex-
tension of the payments.
A synopsis of Litton 's financial position in mid-June
indicated a likely fiscal year-end negative cash flow of $90
to $100 million; it was anticipated that the earnings would
show a decrease for the year and this would further aggravate
the already irritated stockholders. At the same time, Litton
was appealing to various Congressional leaders to provide the
relief the Navy refused to grant.
The pressure was clearly upon both parties to attempt an
immediate resolution to the matter. In anticipatation of
possible repercussions when Litton publicly announced its
plight in the stockholder's annual report, the Navy considered
the alternatives available for a solution. These choices
ranged from holding to the current contracts to cancelling
some LHAs and/or some DDs or entirely terminating both
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contracts. The cost of this latter choice would include a-
bout $750 million for the LHA and $400 million for DD along
I
with the cost of having to continue operating older and less
capable ships [8]. In view of the Navy's strong desire to
have these ships built without undue harm to Litton/Ingalls,
it seemed apparent that the reasonable choice was a renewed
attempt at revising the contract in order to provide an
equitable position for both parties.
In an attempt to reach this goal, officials of the Navy
and Litton met to discuss specific needs. Litton expressed
a dire need for $41 million prior to the end of their fiscal
year (31 July). Roy Ash, then President of Litton Industries,
voiced his concern with respect to the influence the shortage
might have upon the company's ability to renew short-term
credit lines. As a source of immediate relief, discussions
centered on two older claims—the AE and SSN 680. The ammu-
nition ship claims resulted from Litton having to correct
defective specifications prior to production; Litton initial-
ly estimated costs of $35.9 million when the claim was sub-
mitted in April 1971, but subsequent reappraisals reduced the
claim to $31 million. The $31.5 million claim, which was
lodged against the SSN 680,682 and 683 in November 1970, re-
sulted from the alleged late delivery of government furnished
steel which was needed to maintain production schedules. Due
to the dearth of initial supporting data, the Navy could offer
only $7 million in response to the claims [9] . Subsequent
consideration of the two East bank contracts yielded sufficient
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cause to increase the payment offer to $19 million. This of-
fer was refused by Charles B. Thornton, Chairman of the Board
of Directors. He held the position that anything less than
$30 million would be of little assistance; he also proposed
that the LHA contract be revised to a cost, no-fee basis with
Litton accepting no loss.
The differences in negotiating positions continued through
late August when the Navy officially rejected the REA on the
basis of Litton' s failure to specifically identify individual
costs associated with the increased cost request. The contrac-
tor was promised careful and expeditious evaluation of any
claim if it was submitted in the format required by the
Changes clause in the original contract. Although the Navy
contested the magnitude of the claim, it extended the cost-
type payments for 6 months to compensate the shipbuilder for
delays deemed to be the result of government actions. The
change to progress payments would now occur on 28 February
1973.
In mid-November, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
was granted limited access to corporate files in their attempt
to provide a more comprehensive analysis of Litton' s cash flow
difficulties. Meanwhile, attempts to resolve the Reset Pro-
prosal and REA disputes continued without success. The govern-
ment impressed upon the company the need to substantiate
present and future financial positions prior to consideration
of any appreciable relief. Litton reluctantly provided some
of its financial plans.
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Based on data provided by the corporate headquarters,
the DCAA forecasted a $26 million corporate cash surplus at
the end of FY 73. The cash flow projected for the year, how-
ever, would be an outflow of $147.1 million with $40.2 of
that as a result of the Marine Group operations. These pro-
jections were based on the assumption that cost funding would
continue throughout FY 73 despite the fact that Litton had
been informed that these payments would cease in February
[10] . There were several conditions which could impact on
the cash predictions; these included any change to the then
available $155 million line of credit, a possible sale of
Stouffer Food Products for $100 million and the need to repay
approximately $136 million of the $285 million outstanding
long term debt while $33 million was to be renewed and $111
million rolled over.
The DCAA inquiry did confirm the possibility of a sub-
stantial negative cash flow during FY 73; however, the_
limited access provided made it difficult to predict the
probability of such an occurrence and, therefore, did little
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C. CONTRACTING OFFICER'S UNILATERAL DECISION
Negotiations on the Reset Proposal continued through the
fall months and into the new year. In early January, Litton 's
President and Ned Marandino, President of Ingalls, met with
Admiral Kidd, CNM, and other Navy representatives to discuss
the present business climate at the shipyard. Mr. 0' Green
indicated that Litton now had $456 million tied up in the
facility; this total consisted of $305.5 million invested at
the East and West banks, which were now operated as a single
unit, and $150.5 million losses incurred on the contracts in
progress. The losses included $20.5 million on the AE
, $31
million on the submarines and $20 million on the LHA. The
DD-963 was enjoying a $25 million positive cash flow [1]
.
Also included were $133 million of Manufacturing Process De-
velopment (MPD) or "start up" costs.
These MPD costs had arisen as an indirect result of In-
galls' decision to build merchant ships in the new yard.
The estimates, which had been submitted by Ingalls in their
attempt to win the merchant contract, represented the costs
associated with traditional construction techniques. When
costs in the new facility ran higher, Ingalls treated them
as non-recurring, extraordinary costs resulting from the con-
struction of the merchants in the new vice old yard. Since
the new yard had been developed for the LHA and DD, part of
the $155 million MPD expenses were apportioned accordingly
—
$43 million to LHA and $90 to DD-963; the remainder was
charged to the merchants. From the onset, the Navy refused
51

to recognize any of these costs as applicable to their con-
tracts. The Navy had, however, allowed $6 million on the
submarine claim, $1 million on the AE claim and $19 million
for authorized changes on the LHA. A deduction of these a-
mounts from the above claims results in the $150.5 million
loss figure.
Mr.O'Green also addressed an additional claim for $101.3
million which had been submitted in May 1971. This claim for
delay and disruption was later known as the Subsafe or Pro-
ject X claim. In the early 1960s, Ingalls had contracted to
build four nuclear submarines (SSN 621, 639, 648, 652). When
the USS THRESHER was lost in 1963, the Navy instituted exten-
sive design changes in order to upgrade the safety factor
for all nuclear boats under construction. It was not until
mid-1965 that the Navy was able to generate enough informa-
tion so that a reasonable construction effort could continue.
Litton charged that the Navy had applied pressure upon them
to fully man the now-revised subs in order to regain lost
time. Furthermore, they contended that five Navy surface
vessels and 14 merchantships were delayed as a result of in-
creased manning levels on these subs [2] . This claim was
summarily rejected by the Contracting Officer for lack of
adequate substantiation.
Having presented these specific costs, Mr. 0' Green con-
tinued to press the Navy for immediate relief to their alleged
cash flow predicament. He indicated a need for $32 million
for payment of short-term liabilities which would prevent
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violation of a bank-imposed 2.2 current ratio, and future re-
lief for the estimated $140 million overrun on the LHA con-
tract ($100 million above appropriated funds plus $43 million
MPD). He indicated that the lending banks were quite dis-
pleased with Litton' s steadily increasing liability and were
hinting at restrictions on any further expenditure of funds
in the yard.
One can sense the frustration of these arguments in a ver-
bal exchange recalled by Admiral Kidd , "I (Kidd) told him
CO'Green) that we would enter into immediate negotiations and
discussions with Mr. Casey, Litton 's VP for Finances, to try
and find palatable ways to handle their cash flow problem.
I told him that in doing so, we would not look with any favor
on any approach that wasn't cleaner than a hound's tooth.
Mr. O'Green got a little testy at this assertion and told me
that such a stand would indicate that I didn't trust Litton.
I told Mr. O'Green that that wasn't too wide of the mark be-
cause they had been over the past two years of my association
with them, somewhat less than convinced that the contract was
worth anything. Mr. O'Green harked back to what we heard so
many times in the past from Litton to the effect that the
contract was really a vehicle with which to get started and
that it had needed reforming for a long time" [3]
.
The Contracting Officer (CO.) had previously extended the
cost-incurred payments to 28 February in the hope that the
additional time would permit the parties to reach a long
sought agreement on the Reset. Realizing that these efforts
would be fruitless, on that date, he exercised his rights in
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accordance with the contract's DISPUTES clause. Attempting
to unilaterally break the deadlock, he issued the Contract-
ing Officer's Final Decision which addressed delivery
schedules, prices, escalation factors and the method of
future payments. (For Litton's response see pg. 55.)
The Ingalls management continued to encounter delays
which caused the LHA delivery schedule to slip further behind.
The latest proposal from the contractor had LHA-1 delivering
on 14 March 1975 (23£ months late) and LHA-5 available on
17 December 1976 (32 months late) [4] . This schedule was
officially recognized in the Contracting Officer's Decision.
By confirming these dates, he accepted seven months excusable
delay-six months as a responsibility of the government and
one month as a result of the late summer labor dispute which
crippled the yard. The remaining slippage was judged to be
the fault of the builder. The six month delay had been the
basis for the extension of the cost-type payments.
Along with the extended delivery dates, the Decision
raised the Firm Target and Ceiling Price to $795,265 million.
This higher price included $19.3 million for authorized
changes and, in accordance with the original contract, $109.7
million compensation for any additional costs incurred as a
result of the cancellation of four ships [5] . The Firm Tar-
get Price would also serve as the billing base upon which
the future progress payments would be determined. Vessel
labor and material
,
program labor and material and data sys-
tems division data were combined to arrive at a percentage
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completion based on physical progress. This percentage was
then applied to the billing base to determine the cumulative
payment due to the contractor. On 28 February, it was deter-
mined that the LHA program was 44% complete; further computa-
tions revealed that Ingalls had been overpaid $54.6 million
as a result of receiving cost based payments. It had been
agreed in the original contract that such a situation would
be resolved by Litton withholding payment requests for three
months and then paying in a lump sum any remaining balance.
This procedure would shortly become the subject of consider-
able controversy.
The original contract stated that LHA escalation payments
would be made for 24 quarters. With the cancellation of four
ships, the period was shortened to 20 quarters but later
raised to 22 quarters as a result of the six months delay.
During previous negotiations, the two parties had agreed that
48% of the Firm Target Price was applicable to labor cost
escalation with 44% of the price applicable to material esca-
lation. These respective percentages were then allocated
over the 22 quarter period to determine the amount of quarter-
ly costs subject to escalation [6] .
Litton 's response to the Contracting Officer's Decision
was swift. They immediately appealed to the Navy for a de-
ferment on repaying the $54.6 million. Their weekly costs
were slightly more than $3 million; therefore, they would
have received no payments for three months and still owe a
$15 million lump sum debt. The Navy denied this request;
Litton then turned to the courts for relief.
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The corporation appealed to the District Court in Missis-
sippi based on the "spirit" of the contract which discouraged
undue hardship for the contractor. On 7 March, the Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) requiring the Navy
to continue the cost type payments and to refrain from collec-
tion of the overpayment. In early April, the TRO was extended
indefinitely. Meanwhile, Litton had appealed the C.O.'s uni-
lateral decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA); in the process of this action, they listed
the LHA claim at a new value of $376 million.
In October, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New
Orleans awarded the Navy a stay on the TRO. Essentially, the
government could refuse to render any additional payments
until the case was clarified by the court. Realizing that
their cash flow would be interrupted, Litton again sought a
reprieve from reimbursement of the overpayment which was now
worth approximately $30 million; the shipbuilder had made
sufficient progress to reduce the debt. The company was quick
to note that earned escalation, not yet paid, and any claim
awards, which they might gain from the ASBCA decisions,
could easily exceed the amount owed [7] . At this time, the
ASBCA was deliberating the LHA claim along with approximately
$160 million of claims on older contracts (i.e. AE , SSN , Sub-
safe) .
A brief appraisal of the situation provides an insight
to the Navy's imminent reply. The LHA was behind schedule,
the Reset Proposal for the DD-963 contract was due within a
few weeks. Thus far, the contractor had demonstrated his
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capabilities by maintaining adequate progress on the destroyer
program. The fate of the LHA was before two legal forums,
the ASBCA and the District Court of Appeals. The Navy cer-
tainly needed the ships; however, it appeared that attempts
to reach this end were drawing increasing criticism from the
Congress in the person of Representative Les Aspin (D-Wisc).
Consequently, it was paramount that the Navy encourage per-
formance while avoiding the appearance of a "bailout". The
Navy could exert a limited fiscal persuasion on Litton by with-
holding payments; this action could conceivably force Litton
to stop work and maybe close the yard.
»1 . Twenty-One Day Deliberations
The Navy proposed another attempt at reaching a reason-
able settlement. The two parties agreed to partake in a 21
day deliberation session during which time the contractor
would be paid on the basis of costs incurred. These payments
would bear interest at 7 3/4%. The objectives of this meeting
included agreement on a maximum price adjustment (cap) to the
LHA claim and dismissal of the ASBCA appeals and District
Court suit. In return for these considerations, the Navy
would grant a deferment of the "debt" payback [8] . This con-
tract modification was formally executed on 29 October 1973
and would expire on 18 November of the same year.
On the same day, Litton submitted its Reset Proposal
for the 963. The document reflected that the company had
again failed to substantiate their data in accordance with
the contract provisions. They simply submitted the Estimated
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Total Contract Cost figure with no mention of specific pric-
ing for recommended changes. They were directed to resubmit
the offer within 30 days [9]
.
Meanwhile, the negotiations were progressing very
slowly. Ingalls had agreed to submit an initial proposal by
2 November, but as of seven days later had failed to do so.
It was felt that the company was experiencing difficulty in
reaching a consensus of corporate opinion as to the limits
of the offer to be presented to the Navy. The government was
also suffering from an internal organizational disorder. The
Justice Department had become concerned that this contract
modification could interfere with its effort to pursue the
claims issue in the District court. The Office of General
Counsel, as a result of the Justice Department interest,
halted the payments to Litton on 2 November. Upon learning
of that action, the corporation refused to submit their pro-
posal which was already overdue. Following communications
between the Secretary of the Navy and Acting Attorney General
Robert Bork, the modification was approved and on 12 November
the payments resumed. Simultaneously, Litton submitted the
proposal
.
The company presented a document which they felt re-
solved all issues pending from the C.O.'s decision. They
sought an adjustment of $144 million; this consisted of $40
million for changes, $44 million for 32 months delay, $20
million for loss of overhead absorption due to LHA delay and
a $40 million increase to escalation payments which was
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equivalent to seven additional quarters of escalation [10]
.
Following initial consideration and comments from
the Navy, Litton offered a revised plan on 16 November. The
Navy considered this offer also unacceptable. Ingalls had
agreed to cap the claim for only six months. If no agree-
ment had been reached by that time, the company intended to
reinstate the LHA appeal presently before the ASBCA. Addi-
tionally, they contended that any contract modifications,
including those which had been previously adjudicated, would
be subject to upward revision, but could not be reduced be-
low present Navy offers. In view of the differences in bar-
gaining positions, the Navy realized that the 21 day session
might expire without appreciable gain. The payments would
be stopped, but negotiations could continue. The loss of
the weekly payments might inspire Litton to agree to a settle-
ment more favorable to the Navy.
Among those closely observing the proceedings, there
was a feeling that the talks had stalled due to Litton 's
failure to devise a means by which they could explain to
their stockholders and the public, why they would agree to
a $84 million ($40M changes and $44M delay) cap when their
LHA claim was stated to be worth $376 million. At no time
had they presented any documents which could support that
higher figure.
Despite the company's request for a 14 day extension
to the talks, the Commander, Naval Ship System Command
ordered the payments stopped on 19 November and directed the
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collection of interest due and the withholding of progress
payments until the previous overpayment had been liquidated.
The discussions continued through December and into 1974.
Many of the issues, which had been introduced during the 21
day period, were acceptable to both sides; however, the main
point of contention was that the decreasing cash flow fore-
casted for the LHA. Litton held that there must be a zero
negative flow for the life of the contract including any
necessary litigation period. The Navy requested that corpor-
ate personnel provide in writing an outline of their specific
needs for continued solvency of the yard. This request was
answered with a promise to provide such information by
4 January 1974.
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D. LITTON OFFER TO SETTLE CLAIM
On 3 January 1974, Mr. 0' Green and Mr. Marandino met with
Admiral Kidd, Rear Admiral Gooding (COMNAVSHIPS) and several
other Navy contracting personnel. During his review of past
LHA negotiations, Mr. 0' Green indicated that Litton and the
Navy "haven't really started what is required to solve the
problem." This remark was later interpreted to mean that the
Navy had not approached the Congress for assistance as might
be necessary to solve this dispute. He continued by again
highlighting Litton ' s total investment in the shipyard
($456.3 million) which consisted of $305.5 million investment
and $150.8 million losses; also mentioned was a $20 million
debt repayment due immediately. The magnitude of the problem,
as he viewed it, was such that by 1978 there could be an $82
million negative cash flow on the LHA alone [1] . It is in-
teresting to note that Litton had prepared projections out
to 1978 when the then current schedule called for completion
of LHA-5 prior to December 1976.
Mr. 0'Green repeated previously offered solutions includ-
ing reformation of the contract to a cost system, provision
for partial payment against the claim and elimination of per-
formance retentions. He also included as alternatives the
modification of the DD contract to allow payments above the
105% of cost ceiling (i.e. utilize retentions already earned
but not payable under contract terms) or use of advance pay-
ments. He remained opposed to any cap on the claim on the
grounds that Litton should be paid all they deserve without
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limit. The Navy responded by requesting a more specific writ-
ten explanation of the general issues raised by the Litton
officials.
The Navy personnel realized that the numbers presented
by the corporation, if accurate, portrayed a rather grim
future. Nevertheless, the alternatives for relieving the
cash flow shortage required careful consideration. In one
respect
,
[the Navy was limited by Congressional amendment to
the amount of money that could be provided without prior
approval of the Armed Services Committees; on the other hand
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) dictated the
extent of payments allowable to the contractor. Even more
confining was the need to maintain a proper public image.
Although payments could legally be provided, it was always
necessary to avoid any actions which might appear as a "bail-
out" of an "inefficient" shipbuilder. In the meantime, the
government enjoyed a minor victory when the Fifth U.S.
Circuit Court of Appears vacated the District Court order
which had forced the Navy to provide cost-type payments. The
higher court ruled that Judge Cox had lacked the jurisdiction
to issue such an order.
During a meeting of the same personnel two weeks later,
Admiral Kidd informed Mr. 0' Green that cash relief might be
expected in the form of a loan from the retainage funds or
by providing advance payments, if approved by Congress. In
return, Litton would have to cooperate with an audit effort
to confirm the current alleged financial deficit and would
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have to agree to a cap. Litton 's President agreed, although
he expressed some reservations about the extent of an audit.
In anticipation of another counter-proposal from the
corporation, the Navy representatives devised a flexible
plan which provided possible solutions to a multitude of
arguments. In order to promote continued performance, it
was their intention to forward a letter to the parent cor-
poration calling attention to the agreement signed in June
1971 pledging Litton Industries' guarantee for the financial
c
support of Ingalls and its contracts; simultaneously, the
Navy would seek Congressional approval for a $75 million ad-
vance payment. This money would provide long term aid
while a loan could suffice for interim financing.
In the event that Litton chose to stop work, the Navy
had available several options. The Justice Department could
be called upon to initiate court action necessary to enforce
performance. The company would be challenged on the legal
requirement to honor the guarantee given to the government
,
assuring full and faithful performance of the shipbuilding
subsidiary [2] . In order to avoid lengthy litigation, the
Navy might decide to participate with Litton in sharing the
fiscal burden of the shipyard. The Navy estimated that it
could offer approximately $30 million. This amount, consist-
ing of $6 million of escalation payments billed but not yet
paid, was due to normal delays in publishing the indices
upon which the payments were based. The remaining $24 mil-
lion would be taken from performance retainages earned but
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not usually paid until delivery of the ships. These payments
would be predicated upon an audit and cap agreement
.
Due to the impractical ity of any alternative offered in
a Default Termination situation, the Navy considered it un-
wise to pursue any actions which might induce the contractor
to halt production. Any default option considered would re-
sult in the same outcome— Ingalls would build the ships only
if it desired to do so [3] . The Navy could assume management
of the yard with the intention of hiring an outside contrac-
tor to complete the ships. However, the government could
face opposition from the state of Mississippi as the legal
owner of the land on which the shipyard is located.
The two factions met again in late January to discuss
particular aspects of the problem. Attendees included
Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements and Secretary of the
Navy Warner. The contractor indicated that he had invested
nearly $31 million in the program since the payments ceased
in October. All commercial contracts had been completed;
thus, the yard was totally dependent upon Navy support.
Litton 's prime appeal centered on improving the "climate"
in which a settlement could occur and a request for interim
assistance with the cash flow dilemma prior to the corpora-
tion's discussions with its lending consortium. Mr. 0' Green
indicated that outstanding notes payable and long term lia-
bilities due totaled $260 million; he also provided a letter
from Wells-Fargo, which was the lead bank in the 34 member
lending group, forwarning the company about possible restric-
tions being placed on any further shipyard expenditures as
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a condition to the 1974 Credit Agreement [4]
.
It was during this meeting that one of the Navy's strong
bargaining points may have been compromised. When Litton '
s
President objected to the need for a cap on the claim as a
prerequisite for relief, Mr. Clements replied that Litton
could be given six months to decide on a cap figure. They
would then have had 18 months to make such a calculation and
should stand ready to negotiate [5]. Subsequent discussions
revealed the Navy's perception that this capitulation had
weakened their leverage on bringing the contractor to a bar-
gaining position. Litton had, in the meantime, partially
fulfilled the requirement to permit the DCAA to conduct an
audit
.
A copy of the corporate Cash Plan covering the period
August 1973 to July 1975 was provided to the audit agency.
This report confirmed the $31.1 million negative cash flow on
the LHA ; furthermore, the schedule showed sales of Litton'
commercial paper dropping from $73 million in October '72
to $2 million in July '73. The report attributed the decline
to adverse publicity about the Navy contracts. An overall
summary of FY 74 ' s cash plan revealed a $57.1 million short-
fall. In computing this figure, the company assigned $100
million of unused credit lines as backup for commercial paper
or foreign overdrafts. This represented a 100% safeguard;
the same requirement was not shown in the FY 73 plan although
the company stated that it had existed.
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While the SEC regulations do require such disclosures,
they certainly do not demand the total backup. If Litton
had utilized the same policy as in previous years, there would
have been a $42.9 million surplus vice the shortfall [6]. It
was imaginative accounting procedures such as these and
Litton 's refusal to divulge data to support the cash flow
projections which prompted the DCAA to defer any comments
concerning the ultimate impact of the unsettled claims.
On 2 February 1974, the first progress payment on the LHA
contract was presented to Litton. The previous overpayment,
including interest, had been recouped. Physical progress
on LHA production was estimated at 58%.
Throughout the month of February, negotiations continued
in an attempt to arrive at a contract modification which
would provide a mutually approved Reset Proposal including
a cap. The Navy's offer remained at $200 million while
Litton 's tended toward their $376 million claim figure. In
the ongoing discussions, Litton was offered $20 million+
for the settlement of the East bank claims (excluding SUB-
SAFE) to provide them with interim cash relief. The ship-
builder felt obliged to refuse this settlement. The Navy
also suggested, in return for executing the contract modifi-
cation, payment of previously discussed money from the LHA
contract [7] . Litton was receptive to this idea, but again
balked at compromise on a cap.
Ironically, the final draft of the Navy version of the
modification did not include a provision for the claim
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ceiling. In retrospect, it seems perplexing that the Navy
could have been so insistent on such an agreement over a
period of several months deliberations and then have chosen
to discard it. Certainly the contractor had not gained an
advantageous position; why had the Navy intensely bargained
for this condition and not pursued it to a final conclusion?
An unsigned document dated 27 February stated "that the deci-
sion to forego a cap at this time emanated at a higher
Pentagon level" i.e. above NAVMAT or NAVSHIPS.
Litton had agreed that the considerations offered in the
modification (i.e. more current escalation payments and a
revised progress payment system) were sufficient to satisfy
their cash shortages. If they found it necessary to seek
additional extraordinary funding in the future, they would
then negotiate for a cap. Mr. ' Green had previously given
oral acceptance of such a change, but the final version was
not officially accepted.
Mr. Thornton, Chairman of the Board, met with Mr. Clements
and agreed to a cap of $150-200 million in exchange for
approximately $50 million of relief. Previously he had re-
jected this cap as inequitable to Litton. The Navy had since
refined its estimate to slightly more than $100 million for
a reasonable cap amount [8] . The frustrating factor in this
stalemate was that Litton was unwilling to accept the normal
means of payments in such situations. The company had been
offered advance payments on the contract (in reality, a loan)
or provisional payments on the claim. For the latter, there
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was a requirement to submit evidence which would support the
claim. To this plea, Litton had replied, "What do you want
us to do? Build ships or prepare claims?" [9] Consequent-
ly, their constant requests for extraordinary means of
relief resulted in the circuitous and nearly fruitless talks
taking place during this period.
The DD-963 program, which had been almost overshadowed
by the hardships of the LHA, suddenly gained public attention.
Litton informed the Navy that the costs for the 30 ships had
risen by $350 million and might climb as much as $485 million
above that [10] . The Navy approved a $200 million increase
in billing base due to increased costs of supplier's materials
An increase of the full $350 million would raise the price to
the contract ceiling price. At the same time, the analysis
of the Reset Proposal presently under consideration hinted
that the costs might be in excess of the reported $350 million
Representative Les Aspin immediately attacked the Navy
and predicted that it would "totally cave-in to Litton 's de-
mands" during the reset negotiations. Despite the fact that
the Proposal was intended to allow for finalization of costs,
he urged that the Navy "not give them an extra dime". One
could applaud Mr. Aspin for the zealous execution of his
oversight responsibility; however, his resounding attacks on
the Navy and Litton Industries did little to preserve the
failing business relationship between the two.
The exchange of proposals and counter-proposals wore on
into mid-year. Litton was approaching the end of its fiscal
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year in a tenuous situation. The corporation had no tangible
evidence of the Navy's intention to fund their short-terra
cash shortages; Mr. Thornton voiced the redundant warning
that the corporation was having great difficulty persuading
the banks to renew their line of credit. He added that the
company had sold or closed 16 subsidiary companies in the
last 15 months to maintain required ratios [11]
.
1 . Specific Provisions
Litton presented what appeared to be a final effort
prior to the close of their fiscal year and its attendant
credit negotiations. On 24 May, Mr. Marandino confronted the
government with an overture to settle all outstanding issues.
He alluded that the corporate leaders had retreated and he
had been given the authority to effect a settlement. Speci-
fically, he related the belief that the most reasonable
approach was on the basis of a total yard/total cash flow/
total issue solution. His attitude made it apparent that
the company had revised its position and might now be ready
to deal with the Navy.
The President of Ingalls suggested that an out-of-
court decision take place as soon as possible; he left the
impression that the corporation might accept lower payments
than had been previously, sought . The AE , SSN 680 and Project
X claims were in various stages of hearings before the ASBCA.
The Navy's consideration of an equitable value of each would
depend upon an evaluation of the potential ASBCA outcome and
the amount awarded by that body or by the next level of
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appeal, the Court of Claims. The company advised that they
would now accept a $250 million cap. When questioned as to
the support for that figure, they advised that it had arisen
during conversations with "the Navy", but they stood ready
to bargain for a lesser amount [12]
.
The escalation and retention payments sought in pre-
vious modifications were still desired; two new items to be
considered included a change to the method of computing pro-
gress payments and a request for deferral of $2.1 million
owed as interest on the cost payments received during the 21
day negotiation period.
The contractor also resurrected the issue of MPD
costs. The tentative 963 Reset Proposal had acknowledged
that the contractor accepted this $90 million as out of pocket
costs; nevertheless, he now petitioned to have this amount
added to the contract costs for purposes of increasing pro-
gress payments. The government had consistently denied any
liability for these costs. Litton was again advised that
full disclosure of the source of the expenses was necessary
prior to any consideration by the Navy.
Litton' s initiative in creating a renewed atmosphere
for deliberations was cause for hope among Navy officials.
Although the two parties had previously arrived at this state
of imminent cooperation only to see their ambitions dissi-
pate, it was felt that neither could afford to invest any-
thing less than a totally dedicated effort. To this end,
both parties moved to prepare their bargaining positions.
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As an integral part of developing the Navy's offer,
Admiral Kidd realized the necessity of reaffirming the ex-
tent of Litton 's financial plight. With this justification,
he would be able to rally support for the Navy's choice to
provide additional assistance to the shipbuilder. In re-
sponse to his inquiry concerning the previously reported
sale of 16 companies, Senior Vice President Joseph Casey pro-
vided a memorandum which listed just two specific sales,
Rust and Stouffer for $123 million and "other liquidations"
for $27 million [13]. A following letter provided the entire
list of liquidations; it was stated that some occurred "to
avoid additional investment". It seemed that once again
Litton chose to interpret their normal business transactions
to be a direct result of the claims problem rather than
normal management choices.
The stockholder's letter published at the end of the
year referred to these sales as a sound management decision.
The closures and readjustments, most of which occurred in
the Business Systems and Equipment group, were reportedly
a result of the change in demand from electromechanical de-
vices to the fully electronic successors. The phaseout of
some segments were "a continuous and deliberate process"
designed to take advantage of more profitable lines [14]
.
Litton continued to voice concern that the claims
would have a direct impact on the deliberations of their
lending banks. Admiral Kidd and Mr. Thornton engaged in al-
most daily conversations concerning the consequences of the
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Navy's reluctance to provide cash without adequate considera-
tion from Litton. The parties shared mutual worry about any
restrictions on spending at the shipyard. It must be noted,
that at this time, the two Navy contracts were in a cumula-
tive positive cash flow status. The negative flow on the LHA
was more than offset by the DD payments which were 105% of
costs. The LHA escalation payments would expire in November
1974 and it was expected that the positive flow would begin
to decrease at that time.
On 17 July, the corporation concluded a $250 million
revolving credit term loan with 15 participating domestic
banks. A brief analysis of the credit agreement covenants
does not reflect the grim fiscal strain that Litton had
labored so hard to project. The previous agreement contained
an allowable ratio of Funded Debt to Consolidated Adjusted
Net Tangible Assets (CANTA). Litton had experienced diffi-
culty in remaining below the 40% limit and, therefore, en-
countered borrowing difficulties. The newly signed agreement
substituted a Liability to Net Worth ratio which was current-
ly 1.85 to 1, but would become more restrictive in later
years. The $700 million minimum net worth requirement had
not been a problem in the past. The covenants, which re-
stricted acquisitions, dividend payments and treasury stock
purchases, could inhibit the continuation of past growth
policies; however, the Navy could benefit in that the funds
could be utilized within the shipyard. In general, the
commitment of fewer banks to provide more funding during
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this era of tight credit would seem to indicate trust in the
borrower's fiscal potential.
By mid-July 1974, the two parties had been engaged
in concentrated negotiations for the past nine months with
little success. Recently, the Navy had advanced to the con-
tractor a sum of $5.6 million to bring escalation payments
up to date. No other payments had been authorized. The
government had expected Litton to commence submission of 56
constructive change order packages which would substantiate
the $376 million REA, but none had been forthcoming. With-
out these documents, the chance for a bargaining settlement
on the LHA claim was non-existent. On 25 July, Ingalls in-
formed NAVSEA that they intended to pursue the appeal before
the ASBCA rather than rely solely upon attempts at a bi-
lateral resolution. One can only speculate that they must
have considered the chance for success in that endeavor to
be more favorable than attempting to justify the claims as
would have been necessary for a negotiated unanimity.
K. Renfro, E. E., RADM, USN, Deputy Commander for Contracts,
Naval Ship Systems Command, Memorandum for the Record,
Subject : Meeting with Litton/Ingalls Representatives on
3 January 1974—LHA Negotiations
,
4 January 1974.




3. Renfro, E. E., RADM, USN, Deputy Commander for Contracts,
Naval Ship Systems Command, List of U. S. Navy Alterna-




4. Kidd, Isaac, Jr., ADM, USN, Chief of Naval Material, Memo-
randum for the Record, Subject: Meeting with the DEPSECDEF
on 22 January 1974 concerning Litton 's Financial Problems
,






Defense Contract Audit Agency, Report on Review of Fiscal
Year 1974 Cash. Plan Submitted Litton Industries, Inc .
,
p. 7, 29 January 1974.
Renfro, E. E. , RADM , USN, Deputy Commander for Contracts,
Naval Ship Systems Command, Memorandum for the Secretary
of the Navy, Subject: LHA Contract Negotiations With
Litton
,
undated (circa February 1974).
Woodfin, K. L. , RADM, USN, Contracting Officer, Naval
Ship Systems Command, Memorandum for the Secretary of the




Phelan, John J., Office of General Counsel, Memorandum




"Litton Confirms $350 Million Overrun," Washington Star-
News
,
p. C-22, 24 March 1974.
Kidd, Isaac, Jr., ADM, USN, Chief of Naval Material, Memo-
randum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: Chair -
man of the Board Litton Industries, Mr. Thornton, Visit
to NavMat , Thursday, 9 May 1974
,
undated.
Renfro, E. E., RADM, USN, Deputy Commander for Contracts,
Naval Ship Systems Command, Memorandum for Commander,




Casey, Joseph T., Senior Vice President, Litton Industries
Inc., Memorandum to Charles B. Thornton, Subject: Extra -
ordinary Actions to Generate Cash
,
31 May 1974.
Litton Industries, Inc., Annual Report for the Fiscal
Year ended 31 July 1974, p. 4-5, 14 October 1974.
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E. PLAN OF ACTION
Litton began FY 1975 in a rather tenuous manner. There
had been no agreement reached on the DD-963 Reset Proposal
;
efforts to reach an accord on the LHA reset and the claims
,
in general, had again reached a deadlock. The business year
just completed had resulted in a $39.8 million net loss; the
year-end position revealed a violation of the Liabilities/
Net Worth ratio. As the losses on the shipbuilding program
had not yet been recognized, the financial outlook appeared
clouded. With their patience exhausted, Litton chose to re-
instate the LHA appeal before the ASBCA.
It is important to realize that, despite the impressions
presented by the corporate directors, Ingalls was not the
only division of the company in difficulty, especially during
the year then just completed.
In the early years of its operations, Litton displayed
strong growth patterns. In its first four years, sales in-
creased from $3M to $100M; 88% of that increase was due to
acquisition of 17 existing companies. The following corpor-
ate sales increases also testify to Litton 's success: '55-
'57, 215%; '57-'59, 346%; '61-'63, 121%; '65-'67, 74%. After
1968, the trend became much diminished and quite erratic.
The activity ranged from a 4% sales decline between 1971 and
1973 to an increase of 42% between 1973 and 1975. Ingalls'
contribution to corporate sales since 1970 has varied between
9.2% in 1973 and 22.4% in 1975. These numbers should be
viewed with caution, however, since Ingalls computed their
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yearly sales based on percentage of completion of the con-
tracts which had full value equal to the builder's estimated
completion costs vice the actual contract amount. Neverthe-
less, over the past eight years Ingalls has accounted for
an average of 16.5% of Litton ' s sales.
An example of the magnitude of difficulties in non-marine
divisions would be the Business System and Equipment group
in 1974. Two areas of development, business mini-computers
and electronic point-of-sale retail terminals, were continu-
ally reported as requiring heavy investments in return for
future earnings. Despite strong sales growth, the year-end
profits were expected to be very restricted. In the six
month report to the stockholders, the company indicated that
Ralph O'Brien, then head of that division, and William Berry,
head of the typewriter and office-copier branch, had been re-
assigned as director and assistant director of the company's
long-range planning office. The following year both names
were absent from the list of officers. The office copier,
mini-computer and typewriter branches were directed to report
to the corporate president, Fred 'Green. Likewise, the
leadership of the Specialty Paper, Printing & Forms and the
Business Furnishings and Fixture divisions were placed under
the supervision of more senior company officers. The FY 74
Annual Report revealed an annual sales increase of 14%, but
a 31% decrease in operating profits for the Business System
and Equipment group. The company recorded a $60 million
(after tax) write-off for costs associated with the changes
which had taken place in that product line.
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In addition to their internal difficulties, the corpora-
tion was in the grip of constricting external economic fac-
tors. The Material Index for NAVSHIPS Steel Vessel contracts
had increased approximately 30% from the previous year's
level. This index reflected the general price trend for
general purpose and electrical machinery products and steel
mill products. All of these items were needed for ship con-
struction and had appreciably increased in price. The
country was in the midst of a severe energy shortage, which
increased delivery time for needed materials and influenced
the skilled laborers to migrate to more lucrative energy-
related construction industries.
Litton had informally notified the Navy that both pro-
grams could experience delays longer than those already
recognized. It was expected that the last LHA and DD might
be delivered 12 and 18 months later than planned. The Navy's
worst case estimates computed that the LHA could require an
additional nine million manhours resulting in a $169 million
loss to Litton; similar calculations for the DD program
yielded a possible $61 million loss due to an increase of
six million manhours. This total loss figure included MPD
costs [1]
.
The Ingalls management recognized the possibility of
heavy losses on the LHA so they dedicated full manning to
the DD construction and submarine repair with the LHA absorb-
ing any labor shortfalls. The LHA's lagging progress would
be difficult to recover; the DD payments remained at 105% of
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costs. It was in Litton 's best interest to ensure that pro-
gress on that ship did not falter. Ingalls had made several
previous attempts to have the Navy sanction their decision
on manpower assignments. To avoid the possibility that such
an agreement could jeopardize future claim negotiations, the
Navy refrained from any concurrence with their actions. As
long as the shipbuilder made any measurable progress on the
LHA, there was no basis for a default action. The minimal
progress indicated that the delivery schedule, which had been
established in the CO. Decision, would probably not be met.
Meanwhile, discussions continued within the Navy adminis-
tration in an attempt to ascertain Litton 's true financial
needs. In early September 1974, the two sides reached a
joint resolution on the AE claim for which the Navy provided
an $18 million payment. Negotiating personnel had hoped that
in the process of liquidating that claim, they might be able
to settle all of the East bank claims. The SSN-680 and Pro-
ject X claims presented more difficulty. The Justice Depart-
ment was investigating the circumstances surrounding the sub-
marine claim for the possibility of fraudulent supporting
data. The SUBSAFE claim presented a precedent within the
claim area for its alleged disruption or "ripple effect" on
the other contracts. The Navy stood ready to defend this
claim as vigorously as necessary to effect an equitable
settlement
.
The hopes and anticipation for success, normally inherent
in the beginning of a new year, were not evident to those
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involved in the Litton claims endeavor. In a letter to the
NAVSEA Contracting Officer, Joseph Casey, a corporate finan-
cial Vice President , charged that "an inability or lack of
determination on the part of the government to settle legi-
timate claims and changes, has levied a direct and severe
penalty on Litton and its shareholders" [2] . He reflected
that Litton had been hampered in its efforts to take advan-
tage of profitable opportunities due to the great amounts of
money they had to provide to Ingalls. He admitted a portion
of this investment was to be expected in the shipbuilding
industry, but the majority was attributable to the Navy's
refusal to act on changes and claims. Not surprisingly, he
neglected to find any weaknesses in the business acumen dis-
played by the corporation.
Supporting data provided on 16 January 1975 indicated
that LHA costs exceeded payments by $27.1 million; a projec-
tion to FY 78 indicated the deficit could climb to $189.4
million. The DD , however, displayed a positive cash posi-
tion of $57 million. The figures projected that the cumula-
tive flow would become negative sometime during the second
quarter of FY 76 (November 1975-January 1976) [3]
.
Although there was little progress on the LHA claim it-
self, other matters were being pursued. On 17 January, the
two parties reached mutual consent on the debate about in-
terest payments for the original $54.6 million overpayment.
Previously, the Navy had withheld $2.2 million from payments
to cover the debt; it was finally decided to release the
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money pending the outcome of the ASBCA hearing on the entire
LHA issue.
During this same period, the DD-963 Reset Proposal, which
had been resubmitted in late October, was the subject of in-
tense bargaining. Although there were differences on labor
and overhead rates and the amount of escalation to be recovered,
the exchange of reasonable proposals hinted that a settlement
was imminent
.
On 28 March 1975, Vice Admiral Gooding (COMNAVSEA) for-
warded to the Secretary of the Navy, a proposal of a new
dimension. He suggested that mutual responsibility had been
recognized and that Litton had conceded, in principle, to
accept a fixed loss in return for a final solution to the
long-standing dispute. His offering incorporated the use of
4
PL 85-804 to restructure the contract. Additional compro-
mise would be required in the form of a release of claims,
a firm delivery schedule, cash flow relief and a promise by
Litton to retain the funds from the Navy contracts for use
only in the shipyard (Fencing Agreement) 14]. In principle,
this approach was equitable and presented an avenue for
mutual appeasement.
Admiral Kidd viewed it from a more pragmatic aspect.
It was his opinion that the implementation of the law would
relieve the contractor from the responsibility of providing
4This law allows the settlement of contracts through ex-
traordinary means when in the interest of national defense.
For further explanation see page 96.
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specific data necessary to substantiate the REA. Litton 's
past promises to "prove" their position had not been ful-
filled. The use of extraordinary alternatives was not war-
ranted until the validity of the claim had been proven.
Litton had previously guaranteed performance of the shipyard;
to resort to the use of the Public Law would have relieved
them of that responsibility. In the course of preparing its
proposal, the Navy had determined that the last LHA and DD
would probably not be delivered until June 1978 and March
1980 respectively. Admiral Kidd realized the need for an
immediate solution which would secure the availability of
the ships prior to those dates. Nevertheless, he abstained
from forwarding the proposal to SECNAV. It was his opinion
that conditions were inappropriate for such an alternative.
Navy discussions considered that a "fixed loss" contract
was unlikely to motivate the contractor to increase his pro-
duction rate on the LHA. Repairing submarines and building
the DD-963 provided the funds and those would continue to be
the reasonable projects on which he would concentrate his
efforts. Litton had been unable, thus far, to provide a
realistic estimate of final costs for either of the contracts
therefore, deriving a loss figure for Litton would not pro-
vide any assurance of the Navy's final liability. It was
agreed, that any contract change pursued must include firm
delivery dates with more severe late-delivery penalties than
were presently in effect.
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In the fall of 1974, the ASBCA had directed Litton to
quantify the specific amounts included in their LHA appeal.
Litton 's reply, which was finally presented in April 1975,
confirmed the Navy's concern for the steadily rising costs.
Litton submitted a revised claim of $504.8 million. This
new figure was reported to have resulted from delays occur-
ring since 1972 and the '73- '74 rate of inflation of labor
and material prices. The company hastened to point out that
this amount should not be compared to the previous estimate
which lacked adequate provisions for the delay and inflation
The higher figure supposedly included inflation to date and
projected to the 1979 completion date [5] . The total claim
consisted of three categories: Changes $86.1 million, Delay
$337.1 million and Disruption $81.6 million. Included with
the revised REA was an extended delivery schedule which
would result in cumulative delays from 37 months for LHA-1
up to 65 months for LHA-5
.
The Navy and the corporation continued simultaneous dis-
cussions on the LHA dispute and the DD Reset Proposal differ-
ences. Both were in general agreement on the final prices
for the destroyers, but there was substantial disagreement
over the Navy's desire to be released from liability for any
claim causes prior to 28 April 1974 (the cutoff date on
Litton 's price proposal). The Navy held the position that a
price submitted at that time should have reflected all known
reasons for a cost adjustment prior to that date. Litton
hesitated to make that concession since it had not been
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included on the original contract. Additionally, the corpora-
tion stated that their offer had not been prepared with the
claims release in mind. Such a statement would indicate that
they intended to seek future price adjustments; the company
insisted there was no business risk for the Navy in any neces-
sary future price hikes since they (Litton) would have to show
entitlement before seeking such an adjustment from the govern-
ment .
As the LHA bargaining progressed, the Navy recognized a
need to ensure that any funds provided to Ingalls would be
used only in the shipyard. The corporation had continually
presented its appeals based on the hardships inflicted on the
entire conglomerate structure by the troubled shipbuilding
contracts. One can surmise that Litton realized that they
would eventually have to assume a portion of the loss on the
LHA contract. It would have been to their advantage to imme-
diately utilize available funds on more fertile projects in
an attempt to offset any future shipbuilding losses. The Navy's
primary interest was expediting the delivery of its ships.
To ensure that any funds provided in the future would be
applied to the ship contracts, the Navy Comptroller's Office
formulated a tentative "fencing" agreement.
This proposal called for Litton to establish a special
bank account into which all Navy payments to Ingalls would
have been deposited. Over the years, the parent had made ad-
vances to the shipbuilding subsidiary to support its opera-
tions; Ingalls repaid the balance as cash receipts allowed.
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The balance in this account amounted to $159 million. It
was decided that the then present balance would constitute the
minimum to be maintained. While the cumulative cash flow to
Ingalls remained positive, there should have been no need for
additional advances from Litton. When the flow became nega-
tive, Ingalls could have utilized any excess funds in the
"fenced" bank account prior to seeking corporate advances.
The excess payments provided by the Navy would have been de-
posited in the bank account rather than having been used in
other divisions of the conglomerate [6] . This spending re-
striction required that any large payment, such as a claim
settlement, could have been used only in the shipyard. Plac-
ing a lower limit on the advances account prevented the com-
pany from depleting that fund when payments were placed in
the special bank account . While this arrangement provided
that Navy funds would have supported only Navy programs, it
was necessary to consider that the Navy would have been con-
trolling how Litton spent its cash. This "overmanagement
"
by the government might have warranted future criticism from
the contractor for inflicting undue losses upon the corporate
entity.
Following several weeks consideration of the possible
repercussions of interfering with Litton's business decisions,
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (FM) informed Litton in
mid-June 1975 that the "fencing" agreement could be mutually
discarded. In return, the Navy sought and received re-
assurances that there was no bank-imposed restriction on use
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of available credit to support the marine construction pro-
grams.
Even though the funding arrangement was not implemented,
Litton should have been able to sense a renewed urgency on
the part of the Navy. A settlement on the DD Reset appeared
more likely than did an LHA agreement; the Navy indicated to
the corporation that, if necessary, a Contracting Officer
decision would be invoked on the DD contract also.
In an attempt to avoid that choice with its lingering un-
certainty, Mr. Archie Dunn, the Director of Contracts from
Ingalls, met with personnel from NAVMAT on 1 July 1975. Mr.
Dunn informed them that Litton was willing to sign the DD
Reset Proposal including a claim release, as long as it ap-
plied only to the destroyers; no claim would have been lodged
against the DD contract , but could have been included with
the LHA claim as impact. The two parties reached an accord
in late July when the Reset was finally signed, culminating
many months of laborious negotiations. The ceiling price was
set at $2,201 billion which included $62 million for
authorized changes [7] .
It was the hope of the Navy that the success with the DD
talks might have influenced both parties to persist in the
efforts to resolve the LHA contractual dispute. The LHA
trial before the ASBCA would not have begun until mid-1976;
past experience indicated that a final judgment could not be
expected from that body for three or four years. A negotia-
ted settlement appeared to be the only viable alternative.
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In mid-April, Admiral F. H. Michaelis had assumed duties
as CNM. Less than two weeks later, Ned Marandino was re-
placed by Leonard Erb as President of Ingalls. It is this
author's impression that these personnel changes signalled
a perceptible improvement in the business relationship be-
tween the two factions. It is not difficult to realize the
frustration which must have preyed upon the two hard-working
officials who were relieved.
As part of the concentrated effort toward a resolution,
there developed within the Navy two general attitudes as to
how best appease the contractor. The Navy Secretariat was
inclined toward providing a single large payment through the
use of PL 85-804 or a reformed contract; CNM and CNSea pro-
posed smaller continual payments. Both options had their
advantages; the latter, however, would be less likely to draw
Congressional opposition (most of the smaller payments could
be made without seeking Congressional approval) and it would
prevent any misunderstandings about cost allocation, which
might develop with an FP and cost-type contract side by side
in the same yard. Both sides concurred on the obvious need
to take whatever measures necessary to prevent a work stoppage
and on the benefits inherent in carefully awarding new con-
tracts for which Ingalls might have been eligible [8]
.
In an attempt to facilitate the Navy's deliberations,
Ingalls submitted portions of its FY 76-1 Operating Plan.
The company indicated that the significant increases in nega-
tive cash flow could be attributed to the enhanced level of
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manning on the LHA which was necessary to condense the pres-
ent schedule. The yard's employment level, then at 23,000+
had increased by 3,300 in the prior two months with 78% of
the new hires representing critical trades.
On 31 July 1975, the corporate advances made to Ingalls
had a balance of $134 million. The cash flow deficits pro-
jected for the subsequent years to FY 80 equaled $245 million
creating a need for Litton to increase the advances to $379
million. Their projections revealed that the combined cash
flow of LHA and DD would finally become negative in late
September, 1975. The gravity of this financial impact
prompted renewed considerations for any possible means of
relief.
The likely source of funds appeared to be the DD program.
As had been previously mentioned, the progress payments were
limited to 105% of booked costs. This resulted in an accumu-
lation of earned funds which would have been paid as progress
slowed during the later portions of the contract. The esca-
lation retentions amounted to $169 million at the end of
August 1975. A year later, only $60 million remained in the
account. Declining progress before that time resulted in
the remainder being used to maintain the 105% of cost payments
This money could have been released with Congressional appro-
val to raise the payment ceiling above the 105% limitation.
Congressional climate was such that arousing any false suspi-




Funds controlled within the Navy might have also been
available. There was $4 million earmarked for long-lead pro-
curement of materials to support six DD which were to be
built for the Iranian Navy. This program, which was later
reduced to four, was on a cost reimbursable basis and would
have followed the 30th U.S. destroyer. The 963 contract could
have been modified for early release of performance retentions
equal to $1.9 million per ship. These funds would normally
have been available at the time of delivery of each ship.
The final alternative would have required an out-of-court
settlement on a portion of the LHA appeal. As part of the
claim, Litton had challenged the denominator used in a percent-
age of completion fraction. The contractor stated that the
use of an increased material cost figure vice the lower origi-
nal contract figure had resulted in a lower percentage comple-
tion and had been contrary to the intent of the original con-
tract. This equated to a progress underpayment of about $40
5
million; this claim, known as the SACAM issue, carried with
it interest then worth $12 million [9] . In return for any
of these funds, Litton had to withdraw from the ASBCA the
major portion of the LHA claim.
In early November, Mr. Gary Penisten, the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy for Financial Management , enlisted the assist-
ance of an outside accounting firm, Haskin 8s Sells, to
5This portion of the LHA claim referred to a dispute based
on a clause in the Navy Ship Acquisition Manual (SACAM).
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investigate the financial status of the corporation. This
firm confirmed the cash shortfalls which the yard had pre-
sented in the Operating Plan—$72 million in FY 76 and $136
million in FY 77. The corporation would have required an
estimated $215 million of new financing in FY 77; the con-
tinued adverse relationship with the Navy could not have
kept the bankers in a very understanding mood. The account-
ants estimated that the losses on the LHA could climb as
high as $350 million.
The Navy Secretary realized that an immediate plan of
affirmative effort was necessary if the Navy wished to avoid
the possibility of a work interruption. He suggested to
Mr. ' Green that they establish a Plan of Action which could
result in long-awaited financial assistance. This formal
resolution would have addressed both short (less than a year)
and longer-term alternatives.
On 2 December, the Plan of Action was submitted to Litton
for their formal approval. The short-term solutions con-
sisted of certain earned, but not payable, sources of cash
(i.e. escalation, retentions, etc.) which could have pre-
cluded the need for additional financing from corporate head-
quarters. The parties were to engage in negotiations neces-
sary to resolve the early portion ($246 million) of the claim
resulting from the six month delay recognized by the CO.
Decision in February 1973.
The Navy asked that Litton withdraw the LHA appeal from
the ASBCA and that discussions begin immediately. If the
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contractor had been able to provide data to support the merit
of the LHA claim components, the Navy would have had adequate
justification to commence paying off the claim.
During past endeavors of a similar nature, the time limits
allowed for execution of the various stages of a solution had
seemed too confining. As the intended completion dates
approached without significant gains having been realized, the
participants became less cooperative than at the onset of
deliberations. The Navy attempted to prevent a similar re-
occurrence with the Plan of Action. The deadline for short
term efforts extended to February 1976 while June 1977 was
the target for the long-term undertaking.
Also included in the offer was a statement which ensured
each participant of the other's good faith. In the event
that cash was not forthcoming in amounts sufficient to support
a satisfactory production schedule or if provisional payments
did not equal $150 million (number chosen by Litton) by June
1977, Litton could have reinstated the appeal before the
ASBCA. The Navy could have utilized all authority within the
contract and provisions of law to force performance if Litton
had chosen to discontinue working on any of the contracts.
During the period that the Navy was awaiting Litton 's
final approval of the Plan, there was concern whether the
provisions had been sufficient to solve the fiscal dilemma.
Litton ' s bankers had pressed for some assurance that a posi-
tive or zero cash flow would result from the deliberations.
The Navy was not able to provide such a pronouncement.
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Additionally, the success of this action hinged on the cor-
poration's ability to properly substantiate the allegations
in the claim. If they were unable to do so in a timely man-
ner, the entire effort would have collapsed in failure. The
sources of short-term assistance were temporary and not ex-
pected to be sufficient if Litton' s costs continued to
spiral beyond available estimates.
On 7 January 1976, the Plan of Action was officially en-
acted. In so doing, Litton agreed to immediately begin sub-
mission of the supporting documentation for the approximately
50 claim elements. The final submission was scheduled for 1
December 1976. The two parties petitioned the ASBCA for dis-
missal of the LHA appeal with the exception of the SACAM
issue. This request was granted two days later. The Navy
and Litton were prepared to move forward on a concentrated
and well-planned mission in search of a final resolution of
their mutually perplexing dispute.
Naval Material Command, Financial Aspects-Talking Notes -
Litton, August 1974.
Casey, Joseph T., Senior Vice President, Litton Indus-
tries, Inc., Letter to S. C. Kzirian, Code 0225, Naval




Dunn, Archie J., Vice President, Administration, Ingalls
Shipbuilding Division, Letter to S. C. Kzirian, Naval




Gooding, R. C, VADM , USN, Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, Subject
Ingalls/Litton LHA Contract Adjustment , 28 March 1975.
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5. Litton Industries, Inc., News Release, Subject: Increase
of Claim to $504.8 Million , 21 April 1975.
6. Burchfield, F. J., Director of Banking and Contract Financ-
ing, Office of Comptroller, Department of the Navy, Memo-
randum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (FM)
,
Subject: Litton Fencing Agreement , 5 June 1975.
7. Litton Industries, Inc., Annual Report for the Fiscal
Year ended 31 July 1975
,
p. 4, 14 October 1975.
8. Kidd, Isaac, Jr., ADM, USN, Chief of Naval Material, Memo-
randum to NavMat-02, Subject: Litton, 18 August 1975.
9. 'McBride, Gerald, Assistant Deputy Commander for Contracts
(SEA-02B), Memorandum to Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval
Material (P&P) (MAT-02B) , Subject: Draft Paper on Ingalls
Shipbuilding Cash Flow dated 16 September 1975; comments
concerning, 22 September 1975.
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F. PUBLIC LAW 85-804 OFFER BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
W. P. CLEMENTS
On the same day the ASBCA ceased processing the claim,
Litton received a reply to their appeal for adjustments to
the cancellation refund of $109.7 million. When the four
LHAs were cancelled, Litton claimed that this figure had been
derived relative to the ceiling price and that they were en-
titled to approximately $20 million for . an adjustment between
the target and ceiling prices. The Navy, however, replied
that this refund was a maximum amount and that it was co-
ordinated to the target price. Litton 's claim was based on
their belief that a mutual mistake had been made in failing
to specifically denote in the contract which price would
serve as a reference point.
The National Contract Adjustment Board (NCAB), while con-
ducting hearings on this appeal, presented internal memoranda
from Litton which indicated that the corporation's negotia-
tors had known that the target price would be used. These
documents revealed that Litton was displeased with the use
of that figure vice the ceiling price, but made no further
effort to have it changed. Based on this evidence, the NCAB
upheld its previous denial of Litton 's request for adjustment
[1] .
Despite the setback on this aspect of the claim, the com-
pany enjoyed temporary relief when the Navy released approxi-
mately $50 million as payment of the principal sum of the
SACAM claim. This belated progress payment provided sufficient
94

funding to return the two contracts to a cumulative positive
cash flow condition which could have lasted until the fall
of 1976.
In late March, there appeared the first signs that this
renewed effort was proceeding toward positive results.
Litton had submitted the initial documentation to the Claims
Team, headed by Captain Ron Jones from NAVMAT , and was in-
formed that provisional payments could be forthcoming in
early April. Although corporate officials believed that
this package should have yielded a $50 million payment, the
NAVMAT Claims Board recommended that only a $20 million pro-
visional ceiling price increase be approved.
In the meantime, the Department of Defense moved to
assist the Navy with elimination of the $1.7 billion claim
backlog. It was their intention to resolve this dispute
between the Navy and several of the nation's largest ship-
builders-Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics, Tenneco '
s
Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Company and Litton/ Ingalls
.
Following a brief by CNM on 24 March, Deputy Secretary of
Defense William P. Clements decided to pursue a comprehensive
settlement utilizing PL 85-804.
Secretary Clements felt that the claims would have to be
liquidated if the Navy hoped to continue competitive contract-
ing with its private shipbuilders. The existing process of
settlement had proven to be costly, time consuming, and in




In recognition of the flexibility required to cope with
the conditions which arise in the execution of multi-billion
dollar defense programs, Congress had previously instituted
PL 85-804. This law allowed the amending and modifying of
contracts through extraordinary means in the interest of
national defense. It would allow a circumvention of the in-
tricate and often confusing contracting procedures which had
contributed to the delayed resolution of the dilemma. It
required that Congress be notified of its impending use and
that a 60 day waiting period elapse prior to its execution.
On 30 April 1976, Mr. Clements informed the Chairmen of
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees of his inten-
tion to utilize this available means of relief. He estab-
lished 10 June as the date by which he expected to have
reached an agreement with the three large shipyards and
National Steel and Shipbuilding. During this and subsequent
communications with members of Congress, he elaborated on the
specific reason for his decision to invoke the statute.
1 . Basis for the Offer
The Secretary pointed out that of ten claims taken
before the ASBCA since 1969, it had taken five or more years
from the date of the claim to reach a decision. Of the 48
claims which had been negotiated by the Navy since 1969,
half had been settled in less than two years; the remainder
required two to four years for an agreement [2] . The com-
plexity and magnitude of the present claims were such that
little improvement of these settlement times could be
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expected. Business relationships between the Navy and these
shipbuilders had deteriorated to an intolerable level.
The main thrust of his effort pointed to a revision
of the method of escalation payments. With the clause in
effect at that time, the contractor would not have been paid
after the contract delivery date or above the target cost
.
In the case of the LHA, Litton would have been forced to work
for almost five years without additional escalation compensa-
tion. The new clause offered by Mr. Clements would have
frozen the escalation index at the contract delivery date
level, but would have continued to provide payments until
the actual delivery date or until the ceiling price was
reached. This revised payment plan would have gained Litton
about $219 million for the LHA and $112 million for the DD-
963 [3] .
During the period these negotiations were taking
place, the ASBCA ordered the Navy to pay Ingalls $17.3 mil-
lion as a result of the decision on the SSN-680 claim. The
circumstances surrounding the legality of this claim were
still under investigation by the Justice Department. Con-
sequently, the Navy withheld the payment. However, the
government did provide a $16 million increase to the LHA
contract as a provisional payment on the delay portion of
the LHA claim. Since the contractor's weekly costs exceeded
his payments by approximately $1.3 million, the total posi-
tive cash flow was slowly being eroded. It was expected that








interest, $20M-cancellation ceiling, $133M-MPD). In return
for the revision to the escalation clause, it was expected
that the shipbuilders would withdraw the majority of their
remaining claims and grant the Navy a release from future
claims for any events prior to the day of the settlement.
On 10 June 1976, Mr. Clements notified the leaders
of the House and Senate that his group had been unsuccessful
in reaching an agreement with two of the contractors-Litton
and Newport News. Since his original intention had been to
effect an overall resolution to the problem, he withdrew
from the Armed Services Committees the notification to use
the Public Law option. The attempt at mutual understanding
had been a failure. He did request that he be allowed to
reinstate this petition in the event that future negotiations
warranted it. He assured the Congress that the Navy would
move expeditiously to resolve the claims through normal
channels
.
Litton had long agreed that the contract should be
restructured under the authority of PL 85-804. However, they
did not feel that the Secretary's offer reflected an equit-
able value for their claims. If the company had accepted the
$311 million in return for dismissal of the present and
future claims, it would have had to absorb at least the $511
million difference which then existed. With four LHAs and
more than 26 DDs yet to deliver, it is likely that the ship^-
builder anticipated costs to rise above those reflected in
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his claims. Navy officials felt that Litton may have rejected
the original offer in hopes that the Navy would have responded
with one providing additional compensation.
Litton 's rejection raised new fears of an LHA work
stoppage. In mid-June the contractor was receiving about 30£
in payment for each dollar of costs incurred on those ships.
The cumulative cash flow would have become negative within
the next two months although the DD contract would have con-
tinued to provide cash. After reviewing the alternatives,
the Navy decided that continued negotiations as outlined in
the Plan of Action provided the best opportunity for a com-
promise.
On 21 June, Ingalls Vice President Archie Dunn for-
warded to Assistant Navy Secretary Penisten the 77-1 Ingalls
Cash Plan which highlighted an increase of the LHA claim to
$701.7 million ($101. 7M hard-core changes and $600M delay
and disruption). This increase was attributed to approxi-
mately $30 million for new hard-core changes and $200 million
for impact of the LHA upon the DD progress. This plan noted
that the LHA suffered from a $65 million cash deficiency
which would have increased to $407 million by FY 81. The DD
,
meanwhile, was expected to have a $40.6 million final nega-
tive flow. Armed with this latest fiscal outlook, the Navy
Secretariat, NAVMAT and NAVSEA began immediate consideration
of possible means of expediting the claims processing for
provisional payments.
Litton 's financial year drew to a close with the com-
pany in a seemingly tenuous situation. The attempt at
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settlement had faltered; the shipbuilding division's plan
warned of even larger losses than had been previously pre-
dicted. Possibly even more important was the "unsolicited"
attention the corporation had received. Although Secretary
Clements insisted that his proposed settlement had not been
prompted by the fiscal plight of any of the yards, Litton 's
stockholders must have held some doubts about the financial
stability of their investment. Corporate leaders were
faced with calming their fears while continuing intense,
but discreet, appeals for government relief.
An analysis and interviews conducted for the NEW YORK
TIMES inferred that Litton ' s condition was not as serious as
had been projected to the Navy. Spokesmen insisted that the
company was in no difficulty and that the shipyard had earned
a nominal profit. At that time, the only contract which had
earned any "profit" was the DD and it had been reported to
be facing an ultimate loss. The interpretation of shipyard
profit was questionable. Nevertheless, Mr. 0' Green told a
reporter, "We are healthy and strong and are generating cash.
We have never said that we would be unable to fulfill the
(assault ship) contract " [4]
.
1. Cruden, Joseph C, Acting Chairman, NCAB (Navy Contracts
Adjustment Board), Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Installations and Logistics), Subject: NCAB
Decision Upon Rehearing Litton 's Request for Correction
of an Alleged Mistake in the LHA Contract , 9 January 1976,
2. Clements, William P., Deputy Secretary of Defense, Letter
to Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman, Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 11 May 1976.
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"Business Trends—Litton 's Claims: High Stakes Poker,"
New York Times
,
Section C, 25 June 1976.
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G. NOTICE OF INTENTION TO STOP WORK
The apparent sense of security displayed by Litton 's Pres-
ident during his interview was short-lived. In a letter sent
to Secretary Clements on 28 June 1976, the Board Chairman
announced that work on the LHA contract would be discontinued
on 1 August. Although he acknowledged the Navy's efforts to
seek a settlement, he reflected that the company had already
provided considerable support for the shipbuilding program;
with no concrete evidence of a potential solution, this corpor-
ate backing could not continue. Litton estimated that they
had already expended $135 million to continue work on the LHA.
This included $43 million MPD and $92 million in production
costs. This expenditure was in addition to $300 million long-
term investment in the yard facilities. Mr. Thornton recalled
that DOD had admitted to the failings of TPP after the con-
tract had been awarded, but had refused to grant Litton any
relief from the inequities of that system.
He offered two alternatives which could dissuade the com-
pany from its decision. One called for the reformation of the
contract to a cost basis with Litton accepting a fixed loss.
The other would have provided Litton with provisional payments
during the lengthy settlement process. Although the contractor
intended to halt construction as threatened, he assured the
Secretary that the company remained anxious to negotiate on
either of the two suggestions [1]
.
1 . Litton 's Justification
The official termination notice, which was sent to
the Contracting Officer, cited several legal justifications
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for the corporation's decision. The company charged that
the Navy had violated the Anti-Deficiency Act. This statute
prohibits the obligation of funds in excess to those appro-
priated. Litton ' s allegation stated that they would have
been forced to finance the program for $400 million above
the present contract fund level. Since the government had
not appropriated the money to reimburse them for these addi-
tional expenses, company officials contended that the Navy
would have been in violation of the Act; recognizing that
fact, Litton had felt it their duty to cease performance.
The corporate interpretation of the law was correct; however,
in the case of this ship's funding, which is provided from
the much larger Ship Construction, Navy (SCN) general appro-
priation, the Navy argued against the applicability of the
law.
Another point raised addressed the degree of influence
the Navy had reportedly exerted upon the contractor. The con-
cept of the TPP method depended upon Ingalls having had the
freedom to design the ship to performance standards and then
construct it. Litton charged that the Navy had disregarded
the "hands off" method in favor of a "reengagement " which re-
sulted in the Navy having had primary control over the design
and production. The shipbuilder considered the Navy's trans-
gression a blatant violation of the original contract.
Finally, the government was accused of having declined
to honor the Plan of Action executed earlier in the year. It
had been agreed that prompt payment would be made for any
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decisions rendered by the ASBCA. When the board awarded pay-
ment on the SSN-680, the Navy refused to pay a large portion
of the $17.3 million judgment on the grounds that the Justice
Department had not completed the verification of the validity
of the original supporting data. This was alleged to be a
breach of the mutually prepared plan [2]
.
The corporate spokesman insisted that the company
would not have continued performance of the contract if any
funding had been required from Litton. However, Mr. 0' Green
did offer to continue building the ships if full funding was
provided until completion of work or resolution of the claims.
These payments would have taken the form of a contract forma-
tion or steady provisional payments. In support of those al-
ternatives, he indicated that Litton intended to submit their
proposal for a contract conversion through the use of PL 85-
804. The outlook for reaching an agreement via litigation
appeared hopeless; the company would have no longer supported
the Navy program. An extraordinary avenue to settlement was
the remaining alternative.
The formal two-volume reformation document was sub-
mitted on 29 June. This request dealt with the correction of
escalation inequities, correction of the "wrong type" of con-
tract and its consequences, settlement of claims disputes and
payment of short and long-term expenses until a final solution
could be achieved. Also included was the suggestion of the
contractor's willingness to assume a fixed loss on the contract
The Navy had anticipated for some time that the con-
tractor might decide to cease working on the LHA. The
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possibility of such an action had been discussed during the
ongoing discussions of the past few months. Faced with
reality of additional serious delays of the LHA program, the
government's reasonable choice to prevent the work stoppage
lay with the courts. If Litton 's threat had materialized,
the Navy would have had little choice but to seek a temporary
restraining order.
In the meantime, Navy officials busied themselves in
an attempt to find an equitable solution which would have
precluded the need for litigation. Ingalls 77-1 Operating
Plan revealed a need for approximately j£62 million between
August and December 1976. All claim packages were scheduled
to have been submitted by December and it was expected that
provisional or settlement payments could have begun then.
The Navy was concerned with viable means of supporting the
contracts until that time. An additional factor, which com-
pounded their considerations, was that the percentage of LHA
completion computed for the 77-1 Plan had been less than ex-
pected. To compensate for this lag in progress, the Navy
should have withheld payments for approximately 20 weeks.
The government's final choice was to continue with the Plan
of Action, but also to offer to the contractor sufficient
funds to assure continued production.
On 8 July, Litton informed Assistant Navy Secretary
Bowers that they were cancelling their participation in the
Plan of Action. Although the company intended to continue
submitting claim packages, the Navy Claims Team broke off
discussions with their corporate counterparts and deferred
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planning for any provisional payments.
In light of the contractor's actions, a work stoppage
appeared inevitable. In mid-July, the Justice Department
filed a request for the Mississippi District Court to issue
a restraining order which would have forced continuation of
the LHA construction.
On 28 July 1976, District Judge Harold D. Cox issued
a preliminary injunction which directed Litton to continue
building the four remaining ships. The judge held that it
was not the duty of the court to assess fault for the dispute
between the parties, but that it was in the public interest
to have these ships delivered without further delay. He
ordered Ingalls to recall the termination notices which had
been issued to 350 workers and to cancel notices intended for
another 2700 employees. In return for continued performance,
the Navy had to "advance and pay to the contractor on its
requisition of the actual construction costs (labor and mate-
rial) currently incurred in the manufacture and construction
of general purpose amphibious assault ships 2, 3, 4 and 5"
[3]. It was the judge's intention that the nine-month payment
period (until April 1977) would have provided ample opportu-
nity for determination of liability of the two parties in the
claim dispute.
The wording in this decision was the subject of con-
siderable misunderstanding when the payments finally began.
The Navy paid the first invoice request on 11 August, but
then challenged subsequent invoices on the grounds that the
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court order had not intended the Navy to pay various overhead,
fringe and administrative costs. The monthly DD payments ex-
ceeded costs by about $2.3 million and the submarine repair
contracts were showing some profit. Payment of 100% of the
LHA costs would have resulted in a positive cash flow which
was beyond the ostensible reason for the work halt. The Navy
expected that an 86% of cost payment would have provided ample
cash to the contractor and yet comply with the court order.
Judge Cox ultimately clarified the situation when he directed
the Navy to pay 91% of costs incurred.
At the time the injunction was invoked, Ingalls
monthly total costs were about $15 million; costs for labor
and material averaged $10.2 million of the total. The Project
Manager had available $163 million which would have provided
full cost funding until June 1977. The Navy was obviously
concerned with choosing a means by which performance could
have been assured beyond that date. An appeal to Congress
for additional appropriations without adequate justification
would have probably met with stiff opposition. It was neces-
sary to exhaust all available methods of securing voluntary
performance from the shipbuilder. To establish the basis
for a Congressional request , it would have been necessary to
positively determine that it was beyond Litton 's ability to
further finance the LHA project.
In order to explore several alternatives simultaneous-
ly, the Navy instituted a dual approach to the complex ordeal.
The preferred choice consisted of a continued effort to nego-
tiate a settlement following the submission of the final claim
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package in December. At the same time, the Navy prepared
the data necessary to defend the case before the ASBCA. It
was anticipated that Litton would appeal Navy proposal to
that group. A mutual agreement on provisional payments or
an ASBCA decision in Litton 's favor would have provided the
necessary reason for seeking additional funds from Congress.
The secondary effort was directed toward the District
Court. The Navy sought a permanent injunction to follow the
preliminary. With the issue of such a mandate, Litton would
have been legally bound to complete the contract. In con-
sideration of the magnitude of the claim, the court would
have been inclined to direct the Navy to provide some addi-
tional reimbursement. This edict would have also required
Congressional assistance.
Although the Navy was prepared to continue talks with
the contractor, there was no progress toward any understand-
ing. The contractor was recovering 91% of his booked costs
so he had little incentive to pursue an immediate decision.
The cost-type payments assured the Navy that the builder would
continue work on the ships, but they created worries of a
different nature. At the time that the payments began,
Litton 's underprogressed condition equated to a $20 million
overpayment. As a result of the continuing cost payments,
it was estimated that this "debt" would have increased to $90
million by the termination of the injunction. In the event
that the judge ordered a return to progress payments, the
liquidation of the excess payment could have proven devastat-
ing to the contractor.
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Realizing that there was a very limited opportunity
for a negotiated settlement, the government returned to the
ASBCA on 3 January 1977 and requested a continuation of the
LHA appeal proceedings. Deliberations of the claim had been
suspended since January 1976 when the Plan of Action was
formally initiated. In order to pursue the claim with the
ASBCA, the Navy proposed to the District Court that the pro-
ceedings be suspended. On 19 April, the Court replied by ex-
tending the injunction to 31 October and ordering the Navy
to continue the payments. Just prior to the Court's decision,
Litton had filed suit in the U.S. Court of Claims to force
the Navy to pay the $13.6 million still owed on the May 1976
judgment for the SSN-680 claim. The validity of the support-
ing data had not been resolved in the courts; consequently,
the Navy balked at releasing the remainder of the award.
Through the summer months of 1977, the Navy persisted
in the effort to gain a judgment or a suspension from the
District Court. The LHA Project Office was able to continue
the payments only through the judicious use of money original-
ly appropriated as claim settlement funds. Following the in-
junction extension ordered in April, the government had
appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds
that the District Court lacked the jurisdiction to force the
Navy to pay the contractor for costs while the contract called
for progress payments. While awaiting a decision by either
of the legal forums, the Navy formulated no less than 14





These plans included means of dealing with continued
cost payments, progress payments, guaranteed loans, settlement
of remaining portions of the LHA claim and conversion of the
contract to a cost reimbursable basis. The common factors,
which had to be considered in any choice, included the avail-
ability of funds needed by the government, the ability of
the contractor to financially cope with a chosen payment
method and the probability of the shipbuilder being motivated
to bargain for a final solution.
In October, the District Court, as expected, again
extended the injunction to expire on 31 July 1978. Litton
had been reimbursed approximately $134 million in excess of
payments recoverable with a progress payment system. While
the government continued its presentation to the higher court
to have the payments halted, the. Navy was deeply embroiled in
negotiations with Litton officials. Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (M,R&L) Hidalgo had been directed by Secretary Claytor
to concentrate his efforts on a solution of all existing claims,
In September, he had begun talks with Fred 0' Green and one
month later they reached an oral agreement by which the
problem with Litton could be solved.
Litton had submitted the final documentation on their
claim which had been increased by $370 million to a total
value well over $1 billion. The Litton Claims Team supported
by approximately 160 personnel was deeply involved in evaluat-
ing all counts within the claim. Mr. Hidalgo and Mr. 0' Green
mutually decided that the payments could be reduced to 75% of
cost in return for the Navy's expedient processing of the claim.
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In addition, the Secretary offered to hasten the re-
lease of funds being retained on the DD-963 contract. The
slowly diminishing progress on that contract caused the pay-
ments to fall sufficiently below 105% of costs so that the
retention release would not have violated the contractual
ceiling. A third party to the pact, the Justice Department,
agreed on 14 November to suspend the Court of Appeals action
regarding the illegality of the cost payments [4] . The
original three-way agreement called for the reduced payments
to begin on 11 December and extend to 1 April 1978. Through-
out the month of December, it became apparent that there was
common ground for consideration and that a continued exchange
of ideas might culminate in a final solution to the ongoing
dispute. The stage was then set for an early January presen-
tation to Congress on the Navy's intention to again concen-
trate on a bilateral agreement as allowed by PL 85-804. Fol-
lowing hearings in March 1978 and the expiration of the
obligatory 60 day waiting period, the necessary modification
was enacted on 13 April 1978 and the 75% payments were extended
indefinitely.
In the interim, the ASBCA had reached a decision on
the SUBSAFE issue which required the Navy to pay the ship-
builder $50.4 million for a claim which had increased with
interest to a final value of $135.8 million. The Navy imme-
diately paid $31.3 million but protested the remainder.
Finally in late May, the Navy agreed to pay the remaining
$19.1 million along with interest accrued since the decision.
Ill

Assistant Secretary Hidalgo continued bargaining with
the contractor into the summer months. Litton had announced
that their mid-year review revealed that the two contracts
would suffer from eventual cost overruns of $740 million (LHA-
$530M and DD-$210M) [5] . The shipbuilder attributed the in-
creases to higher labor rates, increased manhour estimates and
subcontractor costs and financial recovery of claim litigation
expenses. Nevertheless, the adversaries were closer to agree-
ment that had been evident during the past six years of
fruitless discussions. Each side had a considerable invest-
ment in the success of the deliberations and the ship produc-
tion programs. Secretary Hidalgo had expressed to Congress
his ambition for a negotiated resolution by mid-June.
1. Thornton, Charles B., Chairman of the Board, Litton Indus-
tries, Inc., Letter to Honorable William P. Clements, Jr.,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 28 June 1976.
2. O'Green, Fred, President, Litton Industries, Inc., Letter
to VADM R. C. Gooding, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Com-




3. United States District Court of Mississippi, Judge '
s




4. Hidalgo, Edward, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Man-
power, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1979
,
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States
Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session on S. 2571, '
Part 5, p. 4103-4104, March 1978.
5. "Litton Unit Increases Cost Overrun Forecast on Two Navy




On the afternoon of 20 June 1978, word reached Pascagoula
that a tentative settlement had been reached. Essentially,
the two parties had agreed that Litton would absorb a fixed
loss, the ceiling prices of both contracts would be raised
and future payments would be computed on physical progress.
The Navy's bargaining position had been based on the re-
sults of a DCAA audit which projected that the two contracts
would have cost $647 million more than the amount to which
the contractor was then entitled. This was further assessed
as $486 million on the LHA and $161 million for the DD [1]
.
The independent accounting firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells
confirmed that losses of that magnitude would have severely
strained Litton 's ability to generate necessary financing and
would have placed them in violation of the loan covenants dis-
cussed previously. By the beginning of June, the contractor
had been paid $87 million above the contract ceiling, $168
more than allowable with progress payments but $146 less than
had been expended. If the method of payments had reverted to
a progress basis, the cash deficit would have reached almost
$381 by completion of ship production.
In April, the Litton Claims Team had reported to Assistant
Secretary Hidalgo that of the existing $1,093 billion claim,
they had determined $312 million to be valid. The contractor
had previously received $47 million in the form of a provisional
payment and escalation adjustment. The remaining $265 million
would be paid in accordance with the progress payment system
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outlined in the agreement. Litton would absorb $200 million
of the remaining loss with the Navy accepting the final $182
million. The increase of the ceiling prices, with the up-
dated computations of percentage completion, would result in
a $97 million payment due to the contractor on the effective
date of the contract modification which occurs, at the end
of the 60 day period, in mid-September.
It had been estimated that Litton will have incurred about
$115 million of unreimbursed costs by the effective settlement
date. The $97 million cash payment would reduce that to $18
million which in turn lowers to $182 million the amount of
loss which will be charged against Litton through deductions
from progress payments.
It has not been possible to determine the means by which
the corporate negotiators agreed to the $200 million loss.
During past talks with Mr. 0' Green and Mr. Thornton, Navy
spokesmen had addressed the possibility of a fixed loss rang-
ing from $150 to $250 million. During their analysis of the
entire LHA claim package, the Claims Team concluded that the
initial contract celing price had fallen $330 million short
of the minimum amount necessary to build five LHAs . A portion
of this apparently unintentional underbid was compensated by
the escalation provision. However, $200 million of the final
overrun was attributed to faulty pricing. Strict legal inter-
pretation dictates that this cost, even though arising from
an honest mistake, should be borne by the contractor and may




During a conversation with the author on 29 June, Captain
Jones declined to elaborate on the specific aspects of the
loss figure. In view of the business-sensitive and confiden-
tial nature of the deliberations just past, it was his re-
spected opinion that the limits of the offer proposed by
Litton should not be disclosed. He did indicate that their
starting position included no loss for the corporation and
adjustment to the ceiling price for the full amount of the
claim. He also provided a final categorical breakdown of the
claim and settlement. The figures quoted indicate adjustment























Under the provisions of the proposal, the combined EAC of
both contracts would be $4,726 billion. Subtracting the $200
million loss, the ceiling price for the LHA is $1.3 billion
while the DD ceiling price is $3,226 billion. If the future
costs of construction exceed the EAC figure, the two parties
will share equally up to $100 million overrun. Any additional
expenses, arising from events prior to the June date, will be
borne by the contractor. In the event of completion at a
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lower figure, Litton and the Navy will recoup the savings on
an 80%/20% basis respectively. This share ratio provides a
strong incentive for the shipbuilder to strive for cost effi-
ciency. Additional provisions of the agreement include
deletion of any liquidated damages due the Navy for late
delivery, full release of all claims and actions arising from
events occurring prior to 22 June 1978 including the SACAM
and cancellation ceiling disputes and a release from govern-
ment liability for MPD costs apportioned to the LHA and DD
.
At the time of the agreement, Litton stated these costs to be
$62 million [2] . The corporation does retain the option to
possibly assess future contracts with the remaining $71 mil-
lion of the original $133 million "start-up" costs allocated
to military programs.
In contrast to a similar settlement with the Electric
Boat Division of General Dynamics, the Ingalls compromise
contained no specific provisions for inflation. There were
approximately 24 months remaining until the completion of both
ship programs; more than 90% of materials needed had been pur-
chased and labor rates would remain stable throughout the
remainder of the contract. Consequently, it was felt by both
sides that any effects of inflation would be minimal and
could be compensated for in the negotiated prices.
1. The Effect on Litton
In retrospect, the settlement, if approved by Congress,
provides the only realistic solution to this complex and
highly controversial conflict which had its origin over ten
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years ago. In their third quarter FY 78 report to the stock-
holders, the Chairman and the President of Litton indicated
that their acceptance of the offer had been undertaken with
great reluctance. Despite whatever reservations they held
while doing so, they admitted that it was in the best inter-
ests of the company, shareholders and employees. Even though
they recorded a 32% increase in earnings over the three
quarter period in FY 77, their year end report would show a
loss due to the write-off of the entire $200 million. They
viewed it as an opportunity to start anew and apply all re-
sources of the corporation to a broad-based profit growth [3]
.
Litton 's FY 78 performance was announced in late
August. The company reported fourth quarter operations' in-
come of $28.2 million bringing the year's total to $82.1
million. This represented a 46.8% increase over 1977 income
with a 6.1% increase in sales. However, a $172.9 million
write-off from the settlement of the claim brought the fourth
quarter loss to $144.7 million and the year-end loss to
$90.8 million. Included in this figure were currency losses
of $12.1 million. Board Chairman Thornton stated that, des-
pite the losses on the two contracts, Litton operations in
general "continue to improve" [4]
.
The spokesmen for both parties agreed that depending
upon the litigative processes to settle the claim may have
required an additional seven to ten years of entangled deal-
ings. The legal bodies involved included the ASBCA, NCAB
,
Court of Claims, Federal District Court and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The level of effort necessary to satisfy
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the demands of legal proceedings had been costly for both
participants and had almost become superior in importance
to construction of the ships.
The bilateral accord assures that the Navy will have
the use of the full complement of complex warships initially
ordered. Through the periods of negotiations during the
past years, the Navy had considered delay or cancellation of
some of the ships. Final analyses revealed that there would
have been little cost savings or schedule improvement by do-
ing so. Additionally', the increased fleet capabilities in-
herent in these 35 vessels were sorely needed. The delivery
of the final ships will occur two years late for the DD and
almost six years late for the LHA. The final estimated costs
per ship would result in a 95% and 51% ceiling price increase
for the LHA and destroyer respectively. Nevertheless, the
Navy can now plan for the delivery and use of the ships.
Although the official implementation of the proposed
settlement awaits Congressional approval (due mid-September
11978), NAVSEA personnel feel assured that it will be success-
fully executed. One remaining uncertainty is the future of
the shipyard itself. On 24 March 1978, the yard was awarded
a contract to build four advanced DD-993 for the Iranian Navy.
These ships have expected delivery dates in the 1980-1981
time frame [5] . The facility is tentatively scheduled to
construct one DD-997(H), a Spruance class destroyer capable
of servicing V/STOL aircraft. Ingalls is one of two yards
competing for the DDG-47 (a 963 hull and propulsion plant
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equipped with AEGIS weapon system) production. Additional
contracts for which the yard is expected to compete include
the DDG-2 modernization, LSD-41 and FFG-7 production and
possibly a sixth LHA. The East bank yard continues to over-
haul nuclear submarines; due to the imminent decline in com-
mercial shipbuilding, it is unlikely that Ingalls will bene-
fit from that aspect of marine production. The automated
yard is, by admission of most Navy and DOD leaders, a national
asset. Unfortunately, the possibility of the yard being
able to fully utilize its assembly-line capabilities is
remote. With Ingalls competition facing a similar decline
in demand for their facilities, it is expected that pricing
competition will be quite keen. With the recent Presidential
veto of the Defense Procurement Authorization Bill, the Navy's
entire shipbuilding scheme could be in jeopardy. Overcapacity
may now become Litton 's prime adversary. There are simply
no programs on the horizon which equal the magnitude of the
LHA and DD-963 projects, which were intensely needed by both
parties, but for which the Navy and the shipbuilder paid
heavily.













4. "Litton Industries Posts $144. 7M Fourth Quarter Loss,"
Wall Street Journal
,
p. 2, 1 September 1978.
5. Naval Sea Systems Command Report 250-574, Monthly Progress
Report for Shipbuilding and Conversion, p. 7, 1 May 1978.
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V. CQNCLUS IONS / LESSONS LEARNED
It would be difficult to analyze the events comprising
ten years of conflict between the Navy and a conglomerate the
size of Litton Industries without formulating ideas on what
could be done differently to avoid future recurrences of a
similar nature. Government and industry leaders have contri-
buted significantly to the incidence of written and spoken
"exposes" of the shipbuilding claim problems and how they
could have been avoided. The following represents this
author's observations.
There are two contributing aspects to the Litton claim
which may have been of less significance in the Navy's deal-
ings with other yards. The Ingalls West bank facility is the
first major shipyard built in the U.S.A. since WWII. This
yard was planned and built concurrent with the development of
the ships for which it was designed. The relatively new con-
cept (for American shipbuilders) of building ships in a
modularized format using an "assembly-line" process was intro-
duced into the LHA/DD designs prior to its verification as
a viable construction alternative. Although other yards,
such as Avondale, now utilize a version of this concept,
Ingalls was beset with a myriad of problems in pioneering its
introduction into the U.S. A study by the Maritime Adminis-
tration estimated "that the various assembly and subassembly
areas are the equivalent of six conventional inclined ways in
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terras of the numbers of ships that could be delivered annual-
ly" [1] . Nevertheless, the early delays encountered while
trying to "de-bug" the facility contributed significantly to
the cause of the claims and protracted negotiations associated
with them.
In addition to the problems inherent in the use of an un-
proven construction style, Ingalls contracted to design and
build sequentially two highly complex and extremely different
classes of ships. It had been their intention that the first
destroyer would be delivered approximately six months after
the last amphibian. In fact, the DD-963 was delivered nearly
nine months prior to LHA-1. This juxtaposition of the ship
schedules resulted in the builder claiming appreciable impact
of the delayed LKAs upon the destroyer program. Other ship-
builders have produced diverse vessels simultaneously; New-
port News constructs submarines and aircraft carriers in their
260 acre South yard. It appears that highly sophisticated
coordination is needed to move ship components successfully
through the Ingalls five-bay erection area and into the inte-
gration area prior to launching. The early delay of the LHA
necessitated having mixed ship components rescheduled and re-
routed along the assembly path. This process was further com-
plicated by having to funnel each ship into the proper posi-
tion for movement onto the single launch pontoon.
As a result of the difficulties in the yard and the mili-
tary spending constraints imposed by Congress and the Admin-
istration, it is doubtful that the Navy would again consider
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contracting simultaneously for this many ships with the same
builder. If such an opportunity arose, the costly lesson
learned with Ingalls would provide ample reasons for the Con-
gress and industry to thwart such a move. Few have forgotten
the Navy's ill-fated cost efficiency defense for awarding the
entire 30 ship DD contract to Litton/ Ingalls
.
It is not feasible for a shipbuilder to suspend ship con-
struction during major yard improvements. It is conceivable
that Navy contracts may be awarded to a builder who is in the
midst of renovation. However, the experience as Pascagoula
stresses the poor choice of depending upon a yard to produce
a new class of ship in a facility utilizing untried procedures,
There is no baseline with which intended production milestones
can be compared; there are no reliable manpower estimates for
the ship type or assembly process. The multitude of unknowns
would severely tax the most competent management information
team.
One might oppose such a cautious approach as being counter-
productive to advancements in the industry, but the ultimate
delivery of a ship following six years of delay could hardly
speak well of expectations held early in the life of a new con-
cept. The complex and intricate system integration inherent
in modern warships does not allow them to be designed and
built with anything short of a finely-tuned and well-monitored
production process. Unfortunately, this was not available at
Ingalls during the early years of the LHA and DD-963 programs.
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Much has been written and spoken about difficulties aris-
ing from the use of Total Package Procurement with a FPIS
contract. The contractor has consistently promoted conver-
sion to a cost basis. In establishing a relationship with
the shipbuilders, the Navy has two broad objectives: 1) to
share the financial risks appropriate for the technical,
scheduling and economic uncertainties and 2) to provide in-
centive for early production completion. The contract type
chosen should promote these ideals.
The LIIA and DD were the first ships to be built under
the TPP concept. As early as July 1971, the Defense Depart-
ment recognized the weaknesses in the system when DOD direc-
tive 5000.1 proposed that it not be used for future major
weapon system acquisitions. Their decision was based on the
uncertainties existing in a defense system which is contrac-
ted for before it is fully developed. This same doubt
should have precluded the use of a FPIS contract. This style
of fixed price procurement was used to allow the collection
of adequate pricing information prior to the negotiation of
firm price levels and schedules. In retrospect, if there
was so little known about the design and costs of the two
vessels, a cost type contract covering all ships might have
more suitably fulfilled the contracting objectives. The
government has been willing to admit its error of judgment
in choosing the contractual vehicles and has been besieged
to revert to a cost contract.
There are two points offered in defense of the Navy's re-
fusal to do so. The contract originally used was valid and
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mutually agreed upon. The Navy and the contractor have been
in a deadlock for several years in their joint effort to
assess fault for the numerous counts in the claim. The cor-
porate leaders continually voiced their opinions that the
Navy had a "duty" to fund their shortfalls. A basis for this
attitude is seen in a comment offered by a former Litton
executive who had responsibilities in the contracting area.
He estimated that as a normal practice Litton, in the course
of production and development, renegotiated its (government)
contracts to one and a half times the original price— a nice
margin for inept planning and mismanagement [2]
.
While the FPIS contract may have failed to compensate for
unanticipated price increases, such as inflation and changes
made after award, the weaknesses of contract management served
to fuel an already volatile situation. A cost contract would
have done little to encourage frugality on the part of Ingalls.
Furthermore, it would have been unable to eliminate or even
temper the damaging effects of the manpower shortage exper-
ienced in Mississippi. It is felt that had Ingalls better
coordinated its design and production interface and more thor-
oughly studied the labor market, many of the delays, which
were aggravated by FPIS, might have had far less impact. It
is difficult to imagine how a different type of contract could
have prevented the incidence of the early aerospace-vs-ship-
building design disputes which rocked the company. These
ships have been the victims of a dual-fault "accident"—the
Navy for its choice of contract and decision to deviate from
124

the "hands-off" policy and the contractor for his inability
to properly design and produce the vessels.
Another problem, which appeared to prolong the negotia-
tions, was the absence of specifically designated government
spokesmen. Over the course of years, Litton officials dealt
with NAVMAT, NAVSEA, SUPSHIP, CNO, SECNAV, Assistant Navy
Secretaries and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is high-
ly improbable that the Navy could construct ships without
collective inputs from all of these parties. However, the
company approached these same individuals with pleas for claim
settlement. A review of ten years of assorted public docu-
ments reveals the personalities and foibles of some of the
Navy's negotiators. Each person (or group of persons) pro-
moted his own ideals and solutions to the claim conflict as
they had been nurtured by his organization. The association
of such diverse and individually dynamic managers could not
take place without minor conflict.
The contractor took full advantage of these differences of
opinion to plead his case. In order to strengthen his bar-
gaining position, he occasionally presented figures, such as
a fixed loss amount, to his then present point of contact as
having been offered by "another Navy source." One could
hardly accuse the company of misrepresentation; the corporate
leaders were simply taking advantage of a "best offer" situa-
tion. Following their discussions with one Navy channel,
Litton spokesmen were prone to approach another channel with
details of what had transpired. The second version was often
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a subjective interpretation of the agreements made vice a
verbatim recount of the incident. Consequently, misunder-
standings were bound to develop among the government repre-
sentatives. On one occasion, a Litton official, who was
dissatisfied with a Navy solution, stated that he intended
to approach the Commandant of the Marine Corps as he was "the
real customer" for the amphibious ships.
Processing and settling claims have become almost as com-
plex and time consuming as the preparation for the execution
of the original contracts. Unfortunately, in some cases, the
former endeavor has probably displaced the latter in perspec-
tive. Normal procedures dictate that a very limited number
of government individuals conduct the actual negotiations for
the initial contract. This theory of "controlled participa-
tion" should be extended to. all confrontations with the con-
tractors during the life of shipbuilding contracts. Present-
ly, the contractors seem to have too many avenues of appeal
for points with which they disagree.
If claims arise, a unified and comprehensive defense must
be prepared and executed. A reasonable means of accomplish-
ing such a goal requires that, at most, two individuals (a
principal and a deputy) be designated to represent the govern-
ment's case. It has been proposed that the leaders of the
various branches responsible for ship construction be excluded
from claim negotiations since those, who may have been re-
sponsible for claims arising, are then charged with solving
the problem. This alternative may be slightly extreme in
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nature, but it does stress a point. There should be strong
consideration given to appointing a single source, such as
the Claims Team, to conduct all dealings related to a claim.
All inquiries from industry leaders would be referred to
this group. These individuals must have authority commen-
surate with their responsibility and would have to rely
heavily upon NAVSEA, NAVMAT, SUPSHIP, CNO, SECNAV, etc. for
providing strong supporting evidence. The appointment of such
a forum early in the LHA/DD dispute may have resulted in a
more expedient solution which would have greatly benefited
both parties.
The tribulations associated with the claims will have a
lasting effect on the Navy and the private contractors. The
Navy has since instituted revised procurement procedures with
the FFG-7 program which will hopefully eliminate many of the
conflicts which arose from the contracts of the early 1970s.
It would be premature to believe that the claims are a fea-
ture entirely from the past. The long term nature of ship
procurement combined with a constantly changing American
economy results in a system which is highly susceptible to fi-
nancial pitfalls. Learning from the LHA and DD-963 experi-
ence, the Navy has introduced contract covenants which more
readily provide funding to the contractor.
In their attempt to improve the business relationship
with the ship contractors, the Navy often finds itself under
attack for "bailing out" the builders. The contractors often
interpret the changes to be an admission of guilt for having
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previously executed "unfair" contracts. Unfortunately, an
allegation leveled in RAMPARTS ten years ago continues to in-
hibit the Navy's efforts today; "It is an unwritten law of
the contract state that what the Navy brings to birth, it
does not allow to die. The Navy will see that Litton, its
answer to the decrepitude of the U. S. Maritime industry,
is well taken care of" [3]
.
Litton 's common complaint centered on their cash flow
deficit. For many of the reasons previously discussed, it
was due in part to their own internal weaknesses. The con-
tracting procedures of the government, however, were not
without blame. Any attempt to segregate the impact of the
two becomes a subjective and highly emotional endeavor. It
was, and remains, difficult to accurately evaluate the impact
of the financial deficit upon the corporate structure. The
company's obvious reluctance to open their books for govern-
ment scrutiny leaves one with little choice but to focus on
the more obvious impediments.
Increased lending requirements reported as a result of
the claims would have inflated their interest expenses. The
paucity of available cash could have prevented the company
from taking advantage of more profitable investments. On the
other hand, losses suffered in their other product areas leads
one to believe that management expertise might have been just
as deficient as cash. Nevertheless, the Navy has recognized
the responsibility to more fully support its own programs,
thereby removing a sufficient portion of past hardships from
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its shipbuilders. It is felt that it will require three to
five years to fully evaluate the effects of improved progress
payment and escalation clauses, CPIF and FPI contracts for
lead and follow ships respectively and increased awareness of
causes and solutions to shipbuilding claims. This increased
mutual understanding and sensitivity is necessary if the Navy
is to enjoy continued availability of this critical defense
resource through a period of imminent severe decline in
utilization.
1. U. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
1977 Report on Survey of U. S. Shipbuilding and Repair
Facilities
,
p. 19, December 1977.
2. Horowitz, David and Erlich, Reese, "Big Brother as a
Holding Company," Ramparts
,







CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF KEY DATES
1938 - Ingalls establishes yard at Pascagoula, Mississippi
1953 - Thornton & Ash acquire Electro-Dynamics
1954 - Name changed to Litton Industries
1961 - Litton acquires Ingalls
1967 - Litton announced as winner of competition for FDL
construction
1963 - Construction of west bank yard begins. Ingalls awarded
contract to build four ammunition ships, three nuclear
submarines and seven merchant ships.
1969 - (May) Ingalls awarded LHA Contract (9 ships)
(June) Ingalls launches AUSTRAL ENVOY (first merchant
built in new yard).
1970 - (June) Ingalls awarded DD-963 Contract (30 ships)
(November) Litton files $31. 5M claim against three
nuclear submarines
(December) LHA production reduced to five ships
1971 - (April) Memorandum of Agreement executed
Litton files $35. 9M claim against ammunition ships
(May) Litton files $101. 3M SUBSAFE claim
1972 - (March) L'itton submits LHA reset proposal containing
19^-24 months delay and $246. 6M claim
1973 - (February) Contracting Officer issues final decision
on LHA. LHA delay 23J months to 32 months.
(March) Mississippi District Court orders Navy to
continue cost reimbursable payments. LHA claim raised
to $376M.
(October) Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals awards stay
on lower court order. Navy allowed to stop cost type
payments. 21 day deliberation period starts. Litton
submits DD-963 reset proposal.
(November) Deliberation period ends.
1974 - (January) Litton predicts $82M negative cash flow on
LHA by contract completion.
(February) Progress payments on LHA begin
(March) Litton announces that DD program costs increased
by $350M with possibility of climbing another $485M.
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(September) Ammunition ship claim settled for $18M
(December) LHA escalation payments. completed
1975 - (January) Litton estimates $189. 4M negative cash flow
by completion of LHA Contract.
(April) LHA claim increased to $504. 3M
1976 - (January) Plan of Action enacted (suspends ASBCA review
of LHA claim)
(February) $50M payment to Litton for principal on
SACAM portion of LHA claim
(April) Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements announces
intention to seek settlement with PL35-804.
(May) ASBCA awards Litton $17. 4M for nuclear submarine
claim
(June) PL85-804 offer withdrawn. LHA claim increased
to $701,711. Litton estimate final LHA cash flow defi-
cit at $407M and final DD deficit at $40. 6M. Litton
announces intention to stop work on LHA on 1 August.
(July) District Court issues preliminary injunction
ordering Litton to continue work and Navy to pay pro-
duction costs (91% of booked cost) vice physical pro-
gress payments.
1977 - (April) Court extends injunction to 31 October
(September) LHA claim increased to $1.08B.
(October) Court extends injunction to 31 July 1978
(December) Mutual agreement to reduce payments to 75%
of booked costs and continue negotiations.
1978 - (February) ASBCA awards Litton $50. 4M on subsafe claim.
(April) PL85-804 modification enacted; 75% payment
extended indefinitely.
(May) Litton estimates cost overruns will equal $740M
for both contracts.
(June) Agreement reached on proposed settlement
utilizing PL85-804. Litton awarded $31211 on LHA claim.
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